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A PECULIAR PRIVILEGE IN IDSTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: THE RIGHT TO REMAIN
SILENT
Albert W. Alschuler*

I. !NTRODUCTION: Two

VIEWS OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST

SELF-INCRIMINATION

Supreme Court decisions have vacillated between two incompatible readings of the Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 1 The
Court sometimes sees this language as affording defendants and suspects a right to remain silent. This interpretation - a view that countless repetitions of the Miranda warnings have impressed upon the public - asserts that government officials have no legitimate claim to
testimonial evidence tending to incriminate the person who possesses it.
Although officials need not encourage a suspect to remain silent, they
must remain at least neutral toward her decision not to speak. In the Supreme Court's words, "[T]he privilege is fulfilled only when the person
is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak
in the unfettered exercise of his own will.' " 2 He must have a " 'free
choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.' " 3 The Fifth Amend-

* Wilson-Dickinson Professor and Arnold E. Frieda Shure Scholar, The University
of Chicago Law School. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Harvard University.
Matching the breadth and depth of Jerry Israel's knowledge of criminal procedure
fortunately is not a prerequisite to publishing a paper in his honor. Neither is matching
his wisdom, his thoroughness, his consistently sensible judgment, or the care, precision,
and clarity of his words. As a scholar and educator, Jerry Israel gives brilliantly to the
legal profession, and if the Michigan Law Review had not permitted less accomplished
laborers to write for this issue, the issue would have been thin.
I am grateful to the Leonard Sorkin Faculty Fund and the Sonnenschein Fund at
The University of Chicago Law School for research support in the preparation of this
article and to Penelope Bryan, George Fisher, Richard Helmholz, Dan Kahan, Nancy
King, Daniel Klerman, John Langbein, Stephen Schulhofer, and Welsh White for comments on an earlier draft. A different version of this article will appear in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (R.H.
Helmholz ed., forthcoming 1997).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
3. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976) (quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)).
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ment dictates an "accusatorial system," one requiring "the government
in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load. " 4 On this
view, the concept of waiving the privilege seems unproblematic; one
might waive a right to remain silent for many plausible reasons.
On the Court's second interpretation, the Self-Incrimination Clause
does not protect an accused's ability to remain silent but instead protects him only from improper methods of interrogation.5 This second interpretation emphasizes the word "compelled," a word that appears
upon first reading to express the Self-Incrimination Cl;mse's core concept. In ordinary usage, compulsion does not encompass all forms of
persuasion. A person can influence another's choice without compelling
it; to do so she need only keep her persuasion within appropriate
bounds of civility, fairness, and honesty. Compulsion is an open-ended
concept encompassing only improper persuasive techniques. 6 On this

4. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting 8 JOHN
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 2251, at 317 (John T.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 141-43
(1993).
6. Efforts to define compulsion and related words like coercion, duress, and involuntariness in terms of a subjective sense of constraint are unproductive. See ROBERT L.
HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW 109-33 (1952). Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of Adam, whose dentist recently sued him to recover fees for two dental
procedures.
The case began when Adam awoke one day with a toothache. He went to his dentist who pulled the tooth. Adam later refused to pay the dentist's bill, claiming that his
contract with the dentist was involuntary. He said that his terrible toothache had denied
him any choice in the matter. A judge rejected Adam's contention, and the dentist recovered her fee.
The dentist, however, did not recover her fee for the second procedure. Immediately after her extraction of the tooth, she told Adam that his teeth needed cleaning.
Adam replied that he did not want her to clean his teeth. The dentist then grabbed
Adam's arm, pulled it behind his back, and twisted it hard. Adam screamed in pain, reconsidered his position, and asked the dentist to clean his teeth. He once more claimed
that his contract with the dentist was involuntary, and this time, the judge agreed with
him.
Adam's twisted arm was, however, less painful than his aching tooth. His subjective sense of constraint - his sense that he had "no choice" but to employ the dentist
- was stronger in the case he lost than in the case he won. The distinction between
these cases rested on the fact that a wrongful human action had induced the second contract but not the first. To speak of an overborne will or of an offer that one cannot refuse usually does not help to resolve the issues in either dental cases or confession
cases. A better focus is the propriety or impropriety of human influences on choice. Cf.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) ("The sole concern of the Fifth
Amendment ... is governmenial coercion.").
An action appropriately judged coercive in one setting need not be judged coercive
in another. Much depends on the purposes of the choice allegedly coerced, on the extent
to which some assertedly coercive persuasive technique has subverted those purposes,
HENRY
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view of the self-incrimination privilege, the concept of waiver of the
privilege becomes paradoxical. Although a defendant or suspect might
sensibly waive a right to remain silent, few sane adults would waive a
right to be free of compulsion.7
The two opposing interpretations of privilege advance different interests,8 but the practical difference between them may not be enormous. Like affording a right to silence, forbidding improper means of
interrogation protects against torture, other abusive interrogation techniques, and imprisoning someone for refusing to incriminate herself.
The clash between the two interpretations centers mostly on whether a
fact finder may appropriately treat the refusal of a suspect or defendant
to speak as one indication of her guilt. Griffin v. California, 9 in which
the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment "forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the

and on the strength of the affirmative reasons for permitting the challenged technique of
persuasion.
George Thomas and Marshall Bilder have noted that standard usage treats the
words "compulsion" and "coercion" as essentially interchangeable. The words differ
only because compulsion can arise from many sources while coercion is always the
product of purposeful human activity: "While one would not say the sun coerced S into
wearing a hat, ... one could quite comfortably say that the sun compelled S to wear a
hat" George C. Thomas ill & Marshall D. Bilder, Criminal Law: Aristotle's Paradox
and the Self-Incrimination Pu<.zle, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 257 & n.74
(1991). In the context of the Fifth Amendment privilege (which limits the conduct of
government officers and not of the sun), the difference between the two concepts seems
unimportant
Stephen Schulhofer once· wrote that "compulsion for self-incrimination purposes
and involuntariness for due process purposes cannot mean the same thing." Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 443 (1987). Schulhofer
also has written, "The ... view ... that Fifth Amendment compulsion and due-process
coercion are identical ... would ... make shreds of the entire fabric of Fifth Amendment doctrine and tradition." Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 551
(1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect]. Schulhofer recognized,
however, that in ordinary usage "terms like coercion and compulsion have virtually interchangeable meanings." Id. His point appeared to be that many Fifth Amendment rulings have departed from the ordinary English-language meaning of the Constitution a point that scholars who disagree with Schulhofer undoubtedly would rush to embrace.
See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 662, 684-85 (1986).
7. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 280-82 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 271 (1967); GRANO, supra note 5, at
142.
8. The "right to silence" ~nterpretation emphasizes safeguarding the privacy of incriminating information, tolerating the impulse of an accused person toward selfpreservation, and maintaining an "accusatorial" system. The "improper methods" interpretation simply emphasizes treating suspects and defendants in a humane fashion.
9. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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court that such silence is evidence of guilt," 10 focused the choice between the two competing interpretations more sharply than any other
Supreme Court decision has.
Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griffin invoked the language
of unconstitutional conditions, declaring that comment "is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion costly." 11 Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion replied that "[c]ompulsion is the focus of the inquiry"
and that "the Court in this case stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds." ' 2
Although the majority and dissenting justices in Griffin divided
over which view of the Fifth Amendment privilege to endorse, the
Court's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona 13 the following year embraced
both. The first Miranda warning - "You have a right to remain silent"
- strongly indicated the Court's approval of the "right to silence" interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. So did the Court's expansive accusatorial rhetoric 14 and its demand for a knowing and intelligent

10. 380 U.S. at 615.
11. 380 U.S. at 614. The majority's reliance on the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions in Griffin was unnecessary. Rather than contend that prosecutorial comment
burdens the exercise of a right to remain silent, the majority might have argued that
comment on a defendant's silence violates the Fifth Amendment, pure and simple.
When the defendant in Griffin refused to testify, the prosecutor invited a jury to infer this defendant's consciousness of guilt and his knowledge of incriminating circumstances. The prosecutor thus converted even a silent defendant into a source of evidence
against himself. The defendant might have avoided an unfavorable inference by speaking, but if he had spoken, he would have been obliged to tell the truth. If the defendant
were guilty, and possibly even if he were not, the truth would have been incriminating.
The defendant in Griffin thus might have had no way to avoid incriminating himself; either his truthful speech or his silence would have been treated as evidence of guilt. Because the defendant lacked an alternative, he was compelled to become a witness of
sorts against himself. Cf. 380 U.S. at 613-14.
Although this argument for the result in Griffin seems stronger than the argument
based on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, both arguments depart from ordinary concepts of morality, sensible criminal justice policy, and the historic understanding of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The issue will be examined more fully in this
article.
12. 380 U.S. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart also wrote, "[l]f any
compulsion be detected in the California procedure, it is of a dramatically different ...
nature than that involved in the procedures which historically gave rise to the Fifth
Amendment guarantee." 380 U.S. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ..
14. See, e.g., 384 U.S. at 460 (praising accusatorial procedure).
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waiver of the privilege as a prerequisite to the admission of any statement made by a suspect at the stationhouse. 15
The Court, however, did not direct law enforcement officers to
provide the Miranda warnings whenever they asked a person suspected
of a crime to incriminate herself. Only suspects in custody were entitled
to the warnings, 16 and the Court referred to the "inherently compelling
nature" of custodial interrogation. This language and other aspects of
the Miranda opinion - for example, the Court's discussion of the stratagems that interrogation manuals encouraged law enforcement officers
to use while questioning suspects - suggested that the Court was still
concerned with the quality and extent of the pressure brought to bear
upon suspects and that the Fifth Amendment might not prohibit every
inducement to speak. At the same time, much of the Court's discussion
of stationhouse interrogation indicated that it was compelling only because it undercut the right to remain silent. A reader attempting to infer
from Miranda whether the Fifth Amendment mandated neutrality toward a suspect's decision to remain silent could become confused.
No one really knows what Miranda means. In recent decades, the
Supreme Court has insisted repeatedly th~t the "prophylactic Miranda
warnings . . . are 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution
but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination [is] protected.' " 17 The Court thus has appeared to
suggest that the Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required, but
the Court plainly has no authority under the Constitution to reverse
state court decisions that comply with federal law. 18 The off-hand asser-

15. See 384 U.S. at 475 (declaring that "a heavy burden rests on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination").
16. See 384 U.S. at 444 & n.4. Two years before Miranda, Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964), had indicated that warnings might be required when law enforcement officers questioned any person upon whom suspicion had "focused" - in other
words, whenever they asked a suspect to incriminate herself. If suspects have a right to
remain silent, police interrogation asks them to waive this right whether they are in custody or not, and warnings could help to ensure that their waivers are knowing. The Supreme Court apparently required warnings only for suspects in custody because it concluded that only suspects in custody were subject to compulsion. The Court's analysis
therefore adhered at least nominally to the proposition that the privilege simply guards
against compulsion; it does not guarantee every suspect, in custody or not, a right to remain silent.
17. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)); see also; Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354
(1994); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 424 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) ("[The Miranda exclusionary rule] may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.").
18. See U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2.
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tion of a supervisory power over the administration of state criminal
justice would have been startling, and one hesitates to attribute this assertion to the Supreme Court. 19 The claim that the Miranda warnings
were constitutionally required for prophylactic reasons, however, would
have been less disturbing. As David Strauss has noted, the Supreme
Court often has articulated prophylactic rules to increase the probability
that America's constitutional law in action will correspond to its constitutional law on parchment.20 Perhaps Miranda excludes uncompelled
confessions in some cases to prevent compulsion in o~er cases,21 and
perhaps the Miranda warnings advise suspects misleadingly that they
have a right to remain silent in order to protect the different right that
the Constitution guarantees them, the right to be free of compulsion.22
The Miranda opinion gave at least lip service to the literal "compulsion" interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. Post-Miranda decisions, moreover, have permitted prison officials to treat a suspect's silence as an indication of his guilt in prison disciplinary proceedings23
and have allowed prosecutors to impeach the testimony of defendants at
trial by showing their earlier failures to speak.24 Even after Griffin and
19. The Miranda Court did indicate that the Constitution's requirement of preinterrogation warnings is changeable and contingent "[U)nless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards
must be observed." 384 U.S. at 467.
20. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. R.Ev.
190 (1988). But see Joseph A. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A
Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1985) (arguing that judges
generally lack the authority to· articulate prophylactic rules in constitutional litigation).
21. Stephen Schulhofer has endorsed an alternative view of Miranda that seems
more consistent with the opinion's language but that rests on a seemingly strained and
extravagant proposition. In his view, Miranda held that in the absence of warnings any
answer by a suspect in custody to a police question such as "Would you like to say
anything?" or "Did you do it?" is in fact compelled. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 447 (1987) ("The Court held that the briefest period of interrogation necessarily will involve compulsion.")
22. How Miranda warnings guard against abusive interrogation techniques, however, is unclear. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Those who use
third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers."). The Miranda opinion repeatedly voiced the assumption that its holding would bring defense attorneys into police interrogation rooms
in substantial numbers. The Court cliiimed that lawyers could guard against police
abuse or at least report it See 384 U.S. at 470. The police, however, comply fully with
Miranda by ceasing all interrogation when a suspect requests counsel. See 384 U.S. at
474. Even in 1966, it should have been evident that a police officer would not ordinarily go to the trouble of arran~ng counsel for a suspect so that this lawyer could advise
the suspect not to say anything.
23. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976).
24. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (postarrest silence); Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (pre-arrest silence). But see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.
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Miranda, the privilege against self-incrimination does not entirely ensure suspects that they will not suffer adverse consequences for refusing
to speak. The tension between the two interpretations of the Fifth
Amendment privilege remains unresolved.
This article argues that as embodied in the United States Constitution, the privilege against self-incrimination was not intended to afford
defendants a right to remain silent or to refuse to respond to incriminating questions. Its purpose was to outlaw torture and other improper
methods of interrogation.
Part II of the article reviews some familiar moral objections to affording suspects and defendants a broad right to silence and emphasizes
the extent to which our current criminal justice system departs in practice from its professed accusatorial principles. Part m turns to history,
tracing the path of the privilege from its possible origin 1500 years ago
as a limitation on the scope of the religious obligation to confess
through the decision in Miranda and beyond.
Part III divides this history into three stages. It contends that the
privilege enforced by seventeenth century common law courts against
the English High Commission differed from the privilege that the framers included in the American Bill of Rights in 1791, and that neither the
English nor the American version of the privilege afforded suspects and
defendants a right to refuse to respond to incriminating questions. The
right to remain silent emerged substantially after the framing of the Bill
of Rights. Until the nineteenth century was well underway, magistrates
and judges in both England and America expected and encouraged suspects and defendants to speak during pretrial interrogation and again at
trial. Fact finders did not hesitate to draw inferences of guilt when defendants remained silent. The informal inducements of prenineteenth
century trial procedure were, moreover, great enough that virtually
every defendant did speak.
At the same time, legal treatises and other sources in use at the
time of the framing of the Bill of Rights declared incriminating questioning under oath an improper method of interrogation. They said that
placing a suspect on oath was incompatible with his privilege, and they
frequently analogized questioning under oath to torture. 25 In accordance
with the sentiments voiced by these authorities, courts in England and

a

610 (1976) (maintaining that suspect's silence following Miranda warnings may not
be used to impeach him because the warnings themselves might have caused him to remain silent).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 84-129.
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America neither required nor permitted defendants to answer questions
under oath.26
The coercive power of an oath stemmed partly from its mystic and
religious significance, a significance that modern observers may not
fully appreciate. Even when judged solely in secular terms, however,
oaths undoubtedly seemed coercive to the framers. Once a witness was
placed on oath, her refusal to answer constituted contempt and was subject to c1jminal punishment. Her false answers constituted perjury. The
witness ·could avoid punishment only by telling the truth, and when the
truth was incriminating, she was therefore threatened with criminal punishment unless she condemned herself. That lawyers of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries regarded the threat of this punishment as compulsion should not be at all surprising.
A failure adequately to appreciate the distinction between sworn
and unsworn statements led to slippage from the historic meaning of the
privilege. Unlike an unsworn defendant, a witness who had been sworn
and who was asked incriminating questions could refuse to respond.
This sworn witness had a limited right to remain silent. If the witness
chose to reveal incriminating information, moreover, she could fairly be
said to have waived her privilege against self-incrimination. The objection to interrogating this witness rested on the compulsion effected by
an improper technique of interrogation, however, and did not extend to
all methods of encouraging suspects and defendants to speak.
Language that appropriately described the situation of sworn witnesses ultimately was extended to unsworn suspects, and the silence of
these suspects came to be seen as a moral right. Where the Framers of
the Constitution saw an obligation to the community to speak, later
judges and scholars saw a right to refuse to cooperate in what they regarded as a poetic, inspiring contest between the individual and the
state.
The coercive power of the oath explains why prosecution witnesses and civil litigants, who were sworn, invoked the privilege more
fr~quently and more successfully than criminal defendants, who were
not. It also explains why two groups of historians - those who have
examined the rights of sworn witnesses and those who have examined
the rights of criminal defendants - have asserted strikingly different
dates for the origin of the privilege.
Part IV of the article examines the relevance of this history to current constitutional issues.

26. See infra text accompanying notes 60-62, 77 & 137-50.
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THE PuzzLING ETHICS OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE

In a classic article, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right,
R. Kent Greenawalt discussed the ordinary morality of interrogating a
person suspected of wrongdoing. 27 Greenawalt drew a contrast between
questioning on slender suspicion and questioning on solidly grounded
suspicion, and he offered a number of illustrations of the moral difference between these two practices.
When Ann has little basis for suspecting. that Betty has stolen her
property, Greenawalt suggested that it would be insulting and unfair for
Ann to ask Betty to account for her activities at the time of the theft.
Betty might properly respond, "That's none of your business." If, however, a friend had told Ann that he had seen Betty wearing a distinctive
bracelet like the one that Ann had reported stolen, then Ann might appropriately describe the reason for her suspicion and ask Betty to explain. Ann's query would be less insulting and intrusive than most other
means of confirming or dispelling her suspicion - surreptitiously
watching Betty, searching her possessions, or interrogating her associates. In such circumstances, Betty would have powerful reasons for responding, and if she declined, Ann's suspicion could appropriately
increase.28
Although Greenawalt analyzed close personal relationships and
less personal relationships separately, he concluded that the line between slight suspicion and well-grounded suspicion marked the boundary between proper and improper questioning in both. In Greenawalt's
view of ordinary morality, a person interrogated on slender suspicion
may appropriately remain silent; a person questioned on well-grounded
suspicion may not.29
If the United States Constitution had adhered to Greenawalt's view
of morality, the Fifth Amendment might have provided a limited right
to silence comparable to the limited freedom from governmental
searches and seizures afforded by the Fourth Amendment.30 The Fourth
27. See R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM.
& MARYL. REV. 15 (1981).
28. See id. at 20-26.
29. See id. at 26-32.
30. A common response to Greenawalt's argument is that private interrogation
cannot be analogized to governmental interrogation because interrogation leading to a
criminal conviction has substantially more severe consequences than questioning leading to a private sanction. See, .e.g., Myron Moskovitz, The 0.J. Inquisition: A United
States Encounter with Continental Criminal Justice, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 1121,
1140 (1995). Some private sanctions, however (for example, a discharge from employment), are more severe than some criminal sanctions (for example, unsupervised probation). More importantly, if someone is guilty of a crime, it seems as appropriate for the
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Amendment provides only a qualified immunity from governmental intrusion - one that can be overcome by a showing of probable cause.
The privilege afforded by the Fifth Amendment, however, is unqualified. The Framers of the Constitution apparently concluded that no
amount of evidence could justify compelling a person to supply testimonial evidence against herself in a criminal case. The Fourth Amendment, which forbids only unreasonable searches and seizures, invites
balancing. The Fifth Amendment does not. The Constitution says flatly
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal cas~ to be a witness
against himself.31
Like a police search, governmental interrogation invades a suspect's privacy and should not be permitted without antecedent justification. A limited right to silence - one that could be overcome by a
showing of probable cause - could easily be justified. As many writers
have observed, however, the rationales that the Supreme Court has offered for a more sweeping right to silence are unconvincing,32 and the
government to punish her as for her employer to discharge her. Greenawalt's critics
have not explained why a difference in the severity of the threatened sanction should
cause a turnabout in the principles of justice that he articulated; these critics presumably
do not contend that one should be privileged to frustrate deserved governmental punishment but not deserved private punishment. Although the position of these critics reflects
the almost intuitive liberal sense that the public and private realms are "just different,"
their argument seems seriously incomplete.
31. But see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971) (opinion of Burger, C.J.,
joined by Stewart, White & Blackmun, JJ.) (endorsing balancing).
32. For example, the Supreme Court once maintained that the privilege against
self-incrimination expresses "our respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and . . . the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life.'" Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956)). The Court has since recognized that
the privilege protects privacy only haphazardly. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 400-01 (1976). Even the most expansive view of the privilege would not protect
the privacy of an intimate diary that- contained no matter tending to incriminate its
owner. If, however, the act of producing a grocery list or other impersonal document
would tend to incriminate the person ordered to produce it, she need not respond. Moreover, a grant of immunity lifts the protection of the privilege altogether; with it, a person can be forced to tell all. The privilege does not protect this person's privacy; it protects her only from being forced to incriminate herself.
For convincing responses to most ~f the justifications that the Supreme Court has
asserted for the privilege, see LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT? (1959); WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 59-76
(1967); Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 889-95 (1995); Donald A. Dripps,
Against Police Interrogation ~ And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988); Donald A. Dripps, Self-Incrimination and SelfPreservation: A Skeptical View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 329; Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671
(1968); Charles T. McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility
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more elaborate rationales offered by academic writers are similarly unpersuasive.33 Accepting the common assumption that the privilege affords a right to silence, Stephen Schulhofer recently wrote, "It is hard
to find anyone these days who is willing to justify and defend the privilege against self-incrimination. " 34 Akhil Amar and Renee Lettow added, "Small wonder ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause - virtually
alone among the provisions of the Bill of Rights - has been the target
of repeated analytic assault over the course of the twentieth century
from thoughtful commentators urging constitutional amendments to narrow it or repeal it altogether. " 35
Although the Supreme Court has said that the privilege is the "essential mainstay" of an accusatorial system36 and that it "requir[es] the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load," 37 our legal system is substantially less accusatorial than this rhetoric suggests. The Supreme Court has required defendants to shoulder
much of the load by producing incriminating documents, 38 giving pretrial notice of defenses and of the evidence to be used to support

of Confessions, 24 'TExAs L. REv. 239, 277 (1946); John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur
Seipsum Prodere, 5 HAR.v. L. REv. 71 (1891).
33. For sophisticated defenses of the privilege, see Robert S. Gerstein, Privacy
and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 (1970); Robert S. Gerstein, Punishment and Selflncrimination, 16 AM. J. Jurus. 84 (1971); Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd:
Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 21 UCLA L. REv. 343
(1979); William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1227
(1988). For responses, see David Dolinko, ls There a Rationale for the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1122-37 (1986); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U.
L. REV. 311, 320-21, 322-23 (1991).
34. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 311. For Schulhofer's justification and defense of
the privilege - that it protects innocent defendants who might be unconvincing on the
witness stand - see id. at 327-33. But see Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986)
("The privilege against self-incrimination . . . is not designed to enhance the reliability
of the factfinding determination . . . . "); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966)
(refusing to apply Griffin v. California retroactively because "the basic purposes that lie
behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent
from conviction" and because "the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth"); Donald Dripps, Akhil
Amar on Criminal Procedure and Co~titutional Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong
Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REv. 1559, 1631 (1996) (holding that although the privilege
may benefit some innocent defendants, "[o]ne could say the same thing for a rule that
bars the testimony of prosecution witnesses whose last names begin with the letter R").
35. Amar & Lettow, supra note 32, at 895.
36. See Miranda v. Arizopa, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Tehan, 382 U.S. at 414;
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
37. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (citation omitted).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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them,39 providing copies of defense investigative reports, 40 and supplying all forms of nontestimonial evidence - blood samples,41 voice samples,42 and even, in one case, the body of a child whom a suspect was
thought to have killed. 43
The virtues of an "accusatorial" system in which defendants are
privileged to remain passive are far from obvious. The person who
knows the most about the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant is
ordinarily the defendant herself. Unless expecting her to respond to inquiry is immoral or inhuman - contrary to Greenawal.t's view of ordinary morality - renouncing all claim to her evidence is costly and
foolish. 44
39. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
40. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
41. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
42. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
43. See Baltimore Dept of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). Although the Court viewed the body of the suspected homicide victim as nontestimonial
evidence, it recognized that the act of producing the body might supply testimonial evidence that the Fifth Amendment would permit a suspect to withhold. In Bouknight itself, however, the Court declared the privilege unavailable because a court had adjudicated the suspected homicide victim a child in need of assistance. His mother, the
woman suspected of killing him, therefore held him only as a representative of the state.
More than five years after the Supreme Court decision and more than seven years after
Jacqueline Bouknight was imprisoned for failing to produce the body of her son
Maurice, she was released from a Baltimore jail. See Mother Ends 7-Year Jail Stay, Still
Silent About Missing Child, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at A18. In our accusatorial system, she had served more time for failing to produce evidence of the suspected but unproven killing than she would have served if she had been convicted of manslaughter.
44. When one considers ·the issue as a matter of abstraction, the gain in human
dignity afforded by a "right to silence may seem to justify the substantial burdens upon
law enforcement that the right imposes. The balance, however, may appear more problematic when one focuses on a specific case. For example, shortly before midnight on
May 26, 1996, a driver in Will County, Illinois, killed three teenage pedestrians, then
left the scene of the accident Effective police work located the 1987 Chevy Blazer involved in the accident, but its owner refused to speak to authorities about whether he or
someone else had been driving the vehicle. See Jerry Shnay, More Charges Are
Expected in Fatal Hit-And-Run, Cm. TRIB., June 7, 1996, at 1. One could imagine a
case in which this refusal would make it impossible to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt the owner's guilt of any crime. In this situation, the owner's refusal to answer
might seem more a triumph of incivility than a triumph of human dignity. One wonders
whether the Constitution truly affords a suspect the right to thumb his nose at an aggrieved community in this fashion and: if it does, how the Framers could have viewed
this right as noble and inspiring.
Similarly, one wonders whether it would have been cruel or unfair to ask O.J.
Simpson to explain the strong proof of guilt that prosecutors presented at his trial and to
draw an inference adverse to S~mpson if he declined. Simpson's lawyers evidently concluded that he would increase his chances of acquittal by not discussing before the jury
why telephone company records indicated that he was making calls from his Bronco at
a time when he claimed to have been at home, why he told the limousine driver who
saw him enter his darkened doorway that he had been asleep, whether Nicole Simpson
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Our legal system is in fact wise enough to reject in practice much
of the accusatorial rhetoric it proclaims in theory. It actively seeks incriminating, testimonial evidence from the people it accuses of crime.
Unfortunately, it often does so in troublesome ways. Every year, courts
find that suspects in the back rooms of police stations have made multitudes of knowing and intelligent waivers of their Fifth Amendment
rights. If these suspects had understood their situations in the slightest
degree, most of them would have remained silent.45 In addition, 92 percent of all felony convictions in the United States are .by guilty plea.46
Behind this figure lies the practice of plea bargaining. Prosecutors and
other officials exert extraordinary pressure on defendants, not merely to
obtain an answer, but to secure an unqualified admission of guilt. The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines currently promise a substantially discounted sentence to a defendant who supplies "complete information to
the government concerning his own involvement in the offense. " 47 Few
other nations are as dependent as ours on proving guilt from a defendant's own mouth.
No parent or schoolteacher feels guilty about asking questions of a
child strongly suspected of misconduct. Similarly, no employer considers it improper to ask an employee accused of wrongdoing to give his
side of the story. Criminal cases aside, there are apparently no investigative or fact-finding proceedings in which asking questions and expecting answers is regarded as dirty business. Noting that "parents try
hard to inculcate in their children the simple virtues of truth and responsibility," Justice Walter V. Schaefer once wrote that "the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination ... runs counter to our ordinary standards of morality. " 48
had ever given him a pair of Aris lsotoner gloves, where he had been planning to go at
the time of the chase that everyone watched on television, how his blood could have
been found on his driveway before any blood sample had been obtained from him, and
other troublesome, unresolved questions.
The lawyers' judgment might well have been correct; Simpson probably improved
his chances of acquittal by remaining silent. Encouraging jurors to use their common
sense rather than the "artificial reason" of the law to assess the sounds of Simpson's silence could conceivably have altered the outcome of the trial.
45. For descriptions of the intimidating techniques used by police officers to obtain confessions in the post-Miranda era. see DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON
THE KILLING STREETS 199-220 (1991); Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police
Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAW & SocY. REv. 259(1996).
46. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS - 1994, at 486, tj:>l. 5.49 (1995) (NCJ-154591).
47. U.S. SENTENCING COMMN., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 3.El.l(b)(l) (1995).
48. SCHAEFER, supra note 32, at 59; see also Charles T. McCormick, Law and the
Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 218, 222 (1956) ("Ordinary morality ... sees

Michigan Law Review

2638

[Vol. 94:2625

People who regard criminal defendants as an appropriate source of
evidence for resolving criminal disputes may wonder how the contrary
position became, at least sometimes, a revered principle of American
constitutional law. 49 The common assumption that the privilege mandates an accusatorial system and forbids all efforts to induce a defendant to reveal what she knows explains much of the persistent criticism
of the privilege. This criticism and much other discussion of the privilege, however, have rested on a historical misconception. The privilege
in its inception was not intended to afford criminal def~ndants a right to
refuse to respond to incriminating questions. Its purposes were far more
limited.

ill.

A HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE IN THREE Acrs

The history of the modern privilege against self-incrimination can
be divided roughly into three stages, each of them captured by its own
distinctive formulation of the doctrine. At the earliest stage, the privilege against self-incrimination was expressed in maxims like Nemo
tenetur seipsum accusare ("No one shall be required to accuse himself") and Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum ("No one shall be required to
produce himself" or "No one shall be required to betray himself"). At
the second stage, the formulation was that of the United States Constitution: No person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." At the third stage (the modern stage), the warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona express the general although not
universal understanding of the privilege: "You have a right to remain
silent." These formulations often are treated as equivalent, but they are
very different.
A.

Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum

As Richard Helmholz has demonstrated, the roots of the privilege
in the early seventeenth century are to be found, not in the common law
of England, but in the ius commune - the law applied throughout the
European continent and in the English prerogative and ecclesiastical
courts.50 When seventeenth century common law courts restricted the
power of the High Commission. to ask incriminating questions of sus-

nothing wrong in asking a man, for adequate reason, about particular misdeeds of which
he has been suspected and charged .... I predict that the weaknesses of the privilege in
point of policy and morality will become more widely understood.").
49. Champions of the right to remain silent may wonder about it too.
50. See R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The
Role of the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1990).
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pected religious dissenters, these courts were, for the most part, requiring the Commission to adhere to law that it purported to observe.
Several maxims of the ius commune expressed its most important
limitation on interrogation. fu addition to the familiar nemo tenetur
maxim given above, the ius commune made use of two more: Nemo
punitur sine accusatore ("No one is punished in the absence of an accuser") and Nemo tenetur detegere turpitudinem suam ("No one is
bound to reveal his own shame").51
The principle reflected in these maxims Was unknown in classical
Roman law,52 and when it entered the ius commune is uncertain. A
plausible hypothesis is that the privilege began as a limitation upon the
religious duty to confess.53 By the third century, penance for wrongdoing was an obligation of Christian faith, 54 and the penance occurred in
public. Whether this penance generally included a public confession, or
whether, instead, private confession preceded public penance is a matter
of dispute,55 but the Church ultimately demanded only private (auricu51. Id. at 975, 981.
52. See MAx RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 468 (1927). Early Jewish
law, however, forbade nearly all self-incriminating testimony and excluded nearly all
self-incriminating out-of-court statements. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE
FIFrH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 433-41 (2d ed.
1986); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, The Talmidic Rule Against Selflncrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 955 (1988).
53. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 32, at 896.
54. Earlier, the church may not have recognized any sacrament for the remission
of sins other than baptism. See M. Joseph Costelloe, Penitential Controversy, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 2721, 2722 (Paul Kevin Meagher et al. eds.,
1979); L. Michael White, Penance, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY 708
(Everett Ferguson ed., 1990).
55. Compare R.S.T. HASLEHURST. SOME ACCOUNT OF THE PENITENTIAL DISCIPLINE OF THE EARLY CHURCH IN THE FmsT FOUR CENTURIES 100 (1921) (reciting substantial circumstantial evidence that confession in the early Church was public)
and J.N.D. KELLY, EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES 216 (5th ed. 1977) (noting that in
the third century penitential. discipline "was wholly public, involving confession, a period of penance and exclusion from communion, and formal absolution and restoration") and 1 HENRY CHARLES LEA, A HISTORY OF AURICULAR CONFESSION AND
INDULGENCES IN THE LATIN CHURCH 217 (1968) (1896) ("[D]uring the early centuries the only confession recognized by the Church was . . . made by the sinner in the
congregation of the faithful, unless, indeed, he might be on trial before his bishop and
then it was public in the episcopal court. . . . ") and Eugene LaVerdiere, Confession of
Sin, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARLy CHRISTIANITY, supra note 54, at 223, 224 ("By
the fifth century, the practice of public confession had been replaced by private confession •••. ") with JOSEPH A. FAVAZZA, THE ORDER OF PENITENTS: HISTORICAL
ROOTS AND PASTORAL FlJTllRE 214-17 (1988) (noting that in the third century private confession to a priest was followed by public confession that was liturgical rather
than informative) and John Halliburton, 'A Godly Discipline': Penance in the Early
Church, in CONFESSION AND ABSOLUTION 40, 45 (Martin Dudley & Geoffrey Rowell
eds., 1990) ("Those who write of 'public confession' in the early Church normally fail
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lar) confession. The fourth century Church leader St. John Chrysostom
wrote, "I do not say that you should betray yourself in public nor accuse yourself before others, but that you obey the prophet when he said,
Reveal your ways unto the Lord." 56 Chrysostom's statement was cited
centuries later as a justification for the nemo tenetur principle.57 The
fifth century historian Sozomen explained:
[l]n seeking pardon it is necessary to confess the sin; and since from the
beginning the bishops decided, as is only right, that it was too much of a
burden to announce one's sins as in a theater with the congregation of the
Church as witness, they appointed for this purpose a presbyter, a man of
the best refinement, a man silent and prudent. To him sinners came and
confessed their deeds ....ss
Far from reflecting the notion that wrongdoers have a right to remain silent, the privilege against self-incrimination originally may have
reflected only a pragmatic judgment that a sinner's duty did not include
a public disclosure that might lead to criminal proceedings. To demand
either public disclosure or submission to criminal punishment would
have diminished the willingness of wrongdoers to confess, and confession, not silence, was good for the soul.
By the seventeenth century, the privilege had grown into a right
not to be interrogated under oath in the absence of well-grounded suspicion. All of the formulations of the nemo tenetur principle in the ius
commune were consistent with the concepts of ordinary morality voiced
by Kent Greenawalt. They concerned the initiation of criminal proceedto distinguish between the tenns 'exhomologesis' and 'confessio.' ") and Confession,
Auricular, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION, supra note 54, at 868
("More recent historians of penance are in general agreement that public confession
was never obligatory in the early Church, although penitents may well have confessed
publicly the major sins for which they were doing penance.") and Rights and Ceremonies, in 26 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 790 (15th ed. 1993) (noting that
in the third century, when penitential exercises included fasting, wearing sackcloth, lying in ashes, and other fonns of mortification, "[d]etails of the sins committed were
confessed in secret to a priest, who then pronounced absolution and imposed an appropriate penance").
56. Helmholz, supra note 50, at 982 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See id. Chrysostom also wrote, "[l]f a man hasten to confess his crimes and
show the ulcer to a doctor, who will heal and not reproach, and receive the medicines
from him, and speak with him alone, no one else knowing of it, and carefully tell him
all, he shall easily be quit of his sin." HASLEHURST, supra note 55, at 101 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
58. Confession, Auricular, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION,
supra note 54, at 868 (intern\tl quotation marks omitted). Cyril of Jerusalem wrote,
"[T]he Master . . . . saith, 'I do not compel thee to come into the midst of the theatre,
in the presence of many witnesses: tell the sin to Me, alone, and in private, that I may
heal the sore.' " HAsLEHURST, supra note 55, at 102 (collecting similar sources at 10005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ings, declaring that a person could not be required to "accuse" or "produce" or "betray" himself.59 No person could be required to "reveal"
his own wrongdoing. There must instead be an "accuser," someone
other than the defendant who had revealed or asserted the defendant's
crime. Officials must not commence prosecutions by interrogating at
large, by conducting fishing expeditions, or by questioning on what
Greenawalt would call slender suspicion. Officials in the seventeenth
century and earlier were expected to have probable cause before asking
suspects to respond under oath to incriminating questions.
Unlike the common law courts of the seventeenth century, which
did not permit criminal defendants and other litigants to testify under
oath, the High Commission required parties to swear to answer truthfully all questions that the court might put to them. The High Commission often did so, moreover, without specification of the charges against
a suspect or notification of the questions to be asked. 60 When litigants
challenged the High Commission's power to administer the ex officio
oath, they did so primarily on the ground that the ius commune did not
permit judges to commence ex officio procedures. Unless someone with
an interest in securing the defendant's conviction had accused her or
other strong evidence of her guilt appeared, interrogation of the defendant under oath was improper.61
The difference between the procedures of the High Commission
and other ecclesiastical courts, in all of which defendants were sworn to
tell the truth, and those of common law courts, in which defendants
often spoke but were disqualified from testifying under oath, is important in understanding .the history of the privilege against selfincrimination. The history of the privilege, from the struggles over the
authority of the High Commission through at least the framing of the
59. Wigmore wrote, "The whole rule was embodied in the maxim, 'Licet nemo
tenetur seipsum prodere, tamen proditus per famam tenentur seipsum prodere, tamen
proditus per famam tenetur seipsum ostendere utrum possit suam innocentiam ostendere
et seipsum purgare.' " He translated this sentence as, "Though no one is bound to become his own accuser, yet when once a man has been accused (pointed at as guilty) by
general report, he is bound to show whether he can prove his innocence and to vindicate himself." Wigmore concluded, "Prodere was used in the sense of 'to disclose for
the first time,' 'to reveal what was before unknown.' The whole maxim, far from establishing a privilege of refusing to answer, expressly declares that answers must be given
under certain conditions . . . ." Wigmore, supra note 32, at 83-84. For two relatively
minor corrections of Wigmore's translation, see Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE
LJ. 1329, 1367 (1959). See also LEVY, supra note 52, at 95-96; 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 4, § 2250, at 267 n.l, 275.-76.
60. See Charles M. Gray, Prohibitions and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, in TUDOR RULE AND REVOLUTION 345, 355 (Delloyd J. Guth & John
W. McKenna eds., 1982).
61. See Helmholz, supra note 50, at 975-76.
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American Bill of Rights, is almost entirely a story of when and for what
purposes people would be required to speak under oath. 62
In preliterate societies and, to a lesser extent, in societies in which
a substantial portion of the population remains illiterate, oaths are the
primary means of solemnizing and memorializing important statements
and transactions. In these societies, oaths are sometimes accompanied
by the sacrifice and dismemberment of animals to make the oaths vivid
and also to symbolize the fate awaiting people who default on sworn
obligations.63 God's third commandment to the Israelites was, "Thou
shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. " 64
The Book of Matthew includes Christ's condemnation of oaths,65
but the leaders of the early Christian Church, prompted in part by social
need, concluded that Christ's statement was not meant literally. These
leaders pointed to oaths taken by Abraham,66 St. Paul,67 and even God68
in support of their position. Some later Christians, however, including
some of the seventeenth century religious dissenters who resisted the ex
officio oath, took Christ at his word. They conscientiously opposed all
oaths.
Oaths were "the institutional glue par excellence" of the medieval
Church, and a sixteenth century treatise listed 174 ways in which they

62. As late as 1886 in fact, the Supreme Court wrote:
[A]ny compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath ... to convict him of
crime ... is contrary to the principles of a free government It is abhorrent to the
instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may
suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of
political liberty and personal freedom.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886).
63. See Doctrines and Religious Dogmas, in 11 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, supra note 55, at 422. Fifteen centuries before Christ, a cuneiform tablet
depicted Mithra, the most important god of pre-Zoroastrian Iran, as the god of oaths.
See Mithraism, in 8 id. at 197. See generally Silving, supra note 59. The Book of Genesis reported two promissory oaths taken by placing a hand upon the promisee's genitals.
See Genesis 24:2-9; Genesis 47:29-31.
64. Exodus 20:7 (King James); see also Deuteronomy 5:11; Leviticus 19:12.
65. In the Sermon on the Mount, Christ said:
Again, you have heard that it was said to the people long ago, "Do not break
your oath, but keep the oaths you h~ve made to the Lord." But I tell you, Do not
swear at all: either by Heaven, for it is God's throne; of by the earth, for it is his
footstool; or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the Great King. And do not swear
by your head, for you cannot make even one hair white or black. Simply let your
"Yes" be "Yes," and your "No," "No"; anything beyond this comes from the
evil one.
.
Matthew 5:33-37 (New Am. Bible, rev. ed.).
66. See Genesis 21:23-24.
67. See 2 Corinthians 1:23.
68. See Isaiah 62:8.
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had special significance in the ius commune. 69 Their mystic power was
great enough that in church courts, and even at an early stage in the
King's courts, they sometimes were treated as conclusive proof. A
defendant could swear his innocence and produce the number of compurgatores or "oath-helpers" that the court required. Once the compurgatores swore that they believed the defendant's oath, he was, without
more, acquitted.70 By the seventeenth century, however, far from treating a criminal defendant's oath as conclusive, common law courts
neither required nor permitted criminal defendants to swear to the truth
of their statements. In assessing the coercive power of an oath in that
century, one must recall the spirit of the age. It was still a time when
questions about whether bread and wine became Christ's body and
blood or instead merely symbolized them were matters over which men
willingly fought and died.71
69. The quoted phrase, and some of what follows, are taJcen from R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW (forthcoming 1996), making use of
PAOLO PRODI, IL SACRAMENTO DEL POTERE: IL GIURAMENTO POLmco NELLA
STORIA COSTITUZIONALE DELL'0CCIDENTE (1992).
70. Compurgation as a mode of trial in common law criminal cases did not survive the Assize of Clarendon in 1166. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 578 (3d ed. 1990). It persisted, however, as a mode of trial in
some civil cases until 1602. See id. at 389-94.
71. William J. Stuntz's recent account of the history of the privilege attaches less
significance to oaths than this article does. Although Stuntz recognizes that "people [in
the seventeenth century] took oaths and swearing a good deal more seriously than they
might today," he commented that: "[l]t is hard to believe that the sustained criticism of
the oath ex officio rested primarily on the cruelty of the choice it posed; after all, this
was an era when real racks, not metaphorical ones, were employed with some regularity." William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J.
393, 412-13 (1995).
Stuntz probably overestimated the brutality of English criminal procedure, however; in England, the rack was never employed with regularity. On occasion, the English Privy Council ordered torture for reasons of state, but its goal usually was to gain
information and intelligence about an ongoing conspiracy rather than to gain a confession for judicial use. Torture, a recognized part of Continental criminal procedure, simply had no place in the English common law. Moreover, the last case of officially sanctioned torture in England occurred in 1640, and the use of torture had been very
infrequent in the preceding decades. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE
LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN REGIME 73-123 (1977).
Stuntz's account of the privilege distinguished between cases of religious persecution and "ordinary" criminal cases.
distinction was indeed significant, and the reverence accorded the privilege today is undoubtedly attributable in part to the fact that its
initial champions were courageous defenders of the right to religious freedom rather
than murderers, rapists, and highwaymen.
Stuntz's version of the ta],e, however, seems flawed. As he told it, the privilege,
theoretically available to defendants in both heresy and "ordinary" criminal cases, was
meaningless in the ordinary cases. Most of these cases were effectively resolved by pretrial questioning, and "the privilege was a trial right. It did not affect pretrial questioning, which was not conducted under oath." Stuntz, supra, at 416. Stuntz may have been
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To the charge that use of the ex officio oath was unlawful without
an accuser, defenders of the High Commission responded that Jama
publica (public fame) could take the place of an accuser. Some authorities disputed this proposition, and the sources that recognized a Jama
publica exception to the requirement of an accuser emphasized that rumor alone was not enough:
The fame had to have been the true source of the prosecution; it must not
have had its origins simply in malicious rumor-mongering by the enemies of the accused. Moreover, before proceedings could begin, the existence of public fame had to be proved by the testimony' of trustworthy
persons. It could not simply be assumed to exist. Fi,nally, the public fame
had to be so vehement that scandal would be generated by failure to take
action upon it.72

Under the ius commune, the propriety of inquisition before the
High Commission thus turned upon the proper application of the principles of morality that Kent Greenawalt articulated more than 300 years
later.73 Disputants considered what sort of antecedent justification the
law required before the High Commission could administer the ex officio oath and ask questions. Once an appropriate preliminary showing
had been made, suspects were required to submit to the oath and to
answer.74

unaware that the questioning of common law defendants at trial also was not under
oath; the privilege was as unavailable to defendants at trial as it was during their pretrial
interrogation.
Stuntz's account failed to· consider the fact that heresy and "ordinary" cases were
tried in different courts using different procedures; this fact, more than any other, accounted for their different histories. Contrary to Stuntz's hypothesis, the use of oaths in
religious courts initially prompted common law enforcement of the privilege. The concern voiced about .the coercive character of these oaths was not merely a cover.
72. Helmholz, supra note 50, at 977-78 (citation omitted).
73. Although the defenders of the High Commission argued that the Commission's
actions were warranted by the ius commune, they also maintained that a royal commission, authorized by the Act of Supremacy of 1559, exempted the High Commission
from the requirements that the ius commune imposed on other religious courts. See id.
at 977, 978-79.
74. Some suspects who submitted to the ex officio oath objected later to answering
particular questions. These suspects asserted essentially the same principles as those
who challenged the authority of the High Commission to administer the oath initially.
Helmholz reports that they were required to answer when
there was public knowledge that a crime had been committed ... the public had
an interest in punishing the crime, and ... there were legitimate indicia that the
defendant being questioned .had committed it. This was an accepted principle in
the criminal law. Following its mandate, under principles of the ius commune, defendants had no right to refuse . . . to answer specific questions about their
crimes.
Id. at 983 (footnotes omitted).
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Critics of the High Commission sometimes objected to its procedures for reasons other than the lack of a sufficient evidentiary basis for
questioning. For one thing, they argued that forcing people to answer
incriminating questions under oath tempted them to commit perjury.75
This objection would have been as forceful in cases of questioning on
strong suspicion as in cases of questioning on light suspicion. When defendants testify under oath, an objection to forcing them to choose
among perjury, contempt, or self-accusation - a choice that the Supreme Court has called a "cruel trilemma" 76 - has the potential of creating a broader privilege than the privilege of insisting on an adequate
evidentiary foundation for questioning. This objection appears to condemn forcing people to answer incriminating questions under oath
altogether.
Something like this objection may have been among the circumstances that led common law courts to disqualify criminal defendants
and other interested parties from providing sworn testimony - testimony that, if false, might have jeopardized their souls.77 In the ius com75. Id. at 982.
76. The Supreme Court referred to the "cruel trilemma" as a justification for the
privilege in Murphy v. Waterfront Comnm., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). As Helmholz
notes, the phrase antedated this opinion. See Helmholz, supra note 50, at 983 n.101.
The word "trilemma" does not appear in most dictionaries, but the Oxford English Dictionary notes uses of the word in 1672, 1690, 1725, 1860, and 1887. See 18 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 530-31 (2d ed. 1989).
77. That the common law's testimonial disqualification was a "disqualification"
and not a "privilege" might lead a modem observer to conclude that the disqualification was not intended to benefit the defendants. Being "disqualified" from doing something that other people do does not sound like a favor. Nevertheless, one should resist
this conclusion. The testimonial disqualification of defendants served several purposes,
one of which was to safeguard the defendants themselves.
The primary purpose of the disqualification probably was to keep untrustworthy
evidence from the trier of fact. See Rules of Evidence, No. Ill, Incompetency of Witness
from Interest, 6 AM. JURIST 18 (1831). In addition, the disqualification saved juries
from the disturbing task of resolving swearing contests, contests that would have revealed the imperfection of the oath as a guarantor of truth. See Letter from George
Fisher to author, June 6, 1996 (noting that common law procedure used several devices
to avoid sworn credibility conflicts and suggesting that "our system only quite recently
became comfortable with the idea that a jury could resolve credibility conflicts between
sworn witnesses").
Finally, the disqualification protected defendants. Whatever the law on the subject,
the exercise of a privilege not to testify is likely to give rise to an unfavorable inference, and the temptation to commit perjury rather than to invoke this privilege is likely
to be strong. Only an unyielding disqualification ensures that the government will not
lead defendants to swear falsely and, perhaps, to condemn themselves to damnation. See
infra text accompanying notes 140-47 (describing nineteenth-century opposition to abolition of the testimonial disqualification on these grounds).
One cannot know whether the goal of safeguarding defendants and, initially, other
interested witnesses was among those prompting their disqualification or whether this

2646

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:2625

mune, however, the objection did not lead either to testimonial disqualification or to the establishment of a privilege of sworn witnesses always
to decline to answer incriminating questions. Interrogation under oath
remained permissible so long as public fame or an identified accuser
provided an adequate evidentiary foundation.
During this early era, the discomfort generated by forcing suspects
to answer under oath was great enough that the ius commune exempted
false answers to incriminating questions from the penalties for perjury.
False answers still were punishable as contempt, however, and in the
seventeenth century, the temporal penalties for perjury were not the
most important ones. Although critics of the High Commission objected
that the moral trilemma confronting sworn suspects remained, this objection did not lead common law courts to prohibit involuntary administration of the ex officio oath by the Commission.78
Another, more technical objection to questioning by the High
Commission found greater favor in the common law courts. These
courts forbade questioning by the Commission that could effectively resolve either a civil or a criminal case that the common law courts had
jurisdiction to decide.79 Other privileges were available to suspects
brought before the Commission as well, including a privilege not to be
questioned concerning "secret thoughts. " 80 No suspect, however, successfully asserted an unqualified privilege to refuse to respond to incriminating questions.
Charles Gray describes a habeas corpus action brought by
Maunsell and Ladd in 1607 as "[t]he most concerted assault ever made
on inquisition of any sort by any court." 81 In this case, two Puritan suspects who had been brought before the High Commission challenged
the court's authority to ask incriminating questions, and they lost. Their
case established the propriety of the Commission's interrogation under
oath when (1) the case was within the High Commission's jurisdiction,
(2) the Commission's questioning did not expose the person interro-

purpose was a rationalization and an afterthought. Common law sources, however, asserted this rationale for refusing to permit defendants to testify at least as early as the
late sixteenth century. See infra text accompanying notes 84-94.
78. See Helmholz, supra note 50, at 982-83, 985-86.
79. See Gray, supra note 60, at 355.
80. See id. at 360; Of Oaths before an Ecclesiastical Judge ex Officio, 12 Coke's
Rep. 26 (3d ed. 1727), 77 Eng. Rep. 1308 (1606); Edwards's Case, 13 Coke's Rep. 9
(3d ed. 1727), 77 Eng. Rep. 1421, 1422 (K.B. 1609); LEVY, supra note 52, at 245-46
(discussing Edwards's Case, and Jenner's Case, Stowe MS. 424, fols. 159b-160a
(1611)).
81. Gray, supra note 60, at 360-61.
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gated to a risk of detriment in a common law proceeding, and (3) the
Commission gave sufficient notice of the subject of its interrogation.
In summary, the common law courts enforced more than one privilege against the High Commission, but all of these privileges were compatible with the principles of ordinary morality articulated by Kent
Greenawalt. The most important of these privileges - the privilege not
to be subjected to incriminating interrogation under oath until a specific
accuser or public fame provided a clear basis for suspicion - was in
fact grounded on precisely the moral principles that Oreenawalt later
voiced.

B. No Person Shall Be Compelled in Any Criminal Case To Be a
Witness Against Himself
The privilege against self-incrimination that the Framers included
in the Bill of Rights of 1791 differed from the privilege that the English
common law courts enforced against the High Conµnission. The Fifth
Amendment, declaring that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, plainly refers, not just to the
initiation of criminal proceedings or to a first accusation, but to the conduct of the criminal trial.
By the time a felony defendant reaches trial, a strong basis for suspecting his guilt ought to be apparent,82 and a privilege afforded to defendants who have been placed on trial after a showing of probable
cause goes beyond Greenawalt's principles of morality. Unlike the limited privilege of the ius commune, the Fifth Amendment's privilege was
not designed merely to guarantee an adequate evidentiary basis for interrogation. The Constitution affords an absolute privilege, one that no
evidentiary showing can overcome.83
82. The Fifth Amendment not only sets forth the privilege against selfincrimination but also provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous, crime unless upon presentment or indictment by a Grand Jury."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
83. In one respect, however, the Fifth Amendment's formulation of the privilege is
narrower than the maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum. The Fifth Amendment speaks
only of compulsion to be a witness in a criminal case, but the older maxim could be invoked successfully when there was no ask of criminal punishment but merely a risk of
civil liability or of injury to reputation. See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 449-54 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 631-35
(1896) (Field, J., dissenting); Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates 429, 437 (Pa. 1802); LEVY,
supra note 52, at 423-24, 427;_ ZEPHANIAH SWIFr, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIi.. AND CRIMINAL CASES 77 (Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke 1810) ("It is a
rule of evidence in civil cases, that no man is compellable to testify against his interest,
or to answer any question that will render him liable to an action, charge him with a
debt, or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture."); id. at 79-80 ("A witness is not bound
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In assessing what this constitutional privilege meant to the people
who enacted it, manuals used to instruct justices of the peace on the
conduct of their offices offer a helpful starting point. For nearly 300
years, from 1584 through the mid-nineteenth century, these manuals declared that the nemo tenetur principle precluded the interrogation of
suspects under oath.84 One of the most frequently used manuals in colonial America, Dalton's Countrey Justice, first published in England in
1618, declared, "The offender himself shall not be examined upon oath;
for by the common law, Nullus tenetur seipsum prodere." 85
A manual published in 1745 explained:
The Law of England is a Law of Mercy, and does not use the Rack or
Torture to compel Criminals to accuse themselves .... I take it to be for
the same Reason, that it does not call upon the Criminal to answer upon
Oath. For, this might serve instead of the Rack, to the Consciences of
some Men, although they have been guilty of Offences.... The Law has

to answer questions, the direct object and immediate tendency of which are to degrade,
disgrace, and disparage the witness, and shew his turpitude and infamy .... "); Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101,
164 & n.336 (1992); Wigmore, supra note 32, at 85.
84. For what may be the earliest example, see ANTHONY FITZHERBERT & RICH·
ARD COMPTON, L'OFFICE ET AUCTHORITIE DE JUSTICES DE PEACE 152 (P.R.
Glazebrook ed., 1972) (1584).
For obvious reasons early champions of the privilege against self-incrimination
rarely argued that statements made under oath were less reliable than unswom statements. Nevertheless, Akhil Amar and Renee Lettow, contending that the historic purpose of the privilege was to protect against the use of unreliable evidence, recently proposed a procedure that they called "a solution remarkably like the early scope of the
privilege." Amar & Lettow, supra note 32, at 898. Amar and Lettow would permit
prosecutors to take the depositions of criminal suspects under oath. "The penalty for refusing to answer would be contempt, and the penalty for lying would be perjury." Id. at
898-99 (footnotes omitted). Although prosecutors would not be allowed to use the suspects' statements against them at trial, they would be permitted to introduce evidence
derived from these statements - both physical evidence and the testimony of witnesses
whose existence, location, and identity the suspects had disclosed. This solution "remarkably like the early scope of the privilege" seems more closely to resemble the evil
that the privilege was intended to remedy. See Dripps, supra note 34, at 1565-66, 162335 (offering a powerful - indeed overwhelming - rejoinder to Amar and Lettow's
historical account, suggesting that Amar and Lettow have it backwards, and demonstrating the odd incentives that Amar and Lettow's proposal would create for law enforcement officers). For a discussion of how sharply Amar and Lettow's proposal departs
from a century of more recent history, see Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda
Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REv. 929
(1995). For Amar and Lettow's rejoinder, see Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow,
Self-Incrimination and the Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder to Professor Kamisar, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1011 (1995).
85. MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 273 (Professional Books 1973)
(1619).
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therefore wisely and mercifully laid down this Maxim, Nemo tenetur
seipsum prodere.86

Nineteenth-century American manuals substituted the language of
the Bill of Rights for the familiar Latin maxim:
No man shall be compelled to give evidence against himself. Hence it is
held that if a criminal be sworn to his examination taken before a justice,
it shall not be read against him. 87
The prisoner is not to be examined on oath, fo~ this would be a species
of duress, and a violation of the maxim, that no one is bound to criminate himself. 88

All of these manuals noted the coercive force of an oath (a force
derived from both the secular penalties for perjury and the supernatural
sanctions for falsely invoking God's name), and they linked the disqualification of suspects and defendants from testifying under oath to the
privilege against self-incrimination.
The claim that incriminating interrogation under oath is forbidden
for the same reason that torture is forbidden was asserted by religious
dissenters in England and embraced by religious dissenters in America.
In about 1591, Thomas Cartwright and eight Puritan colleagues objected that the ex officio oath "put the conscience uppon the racke. " 89
In 1637 John Lilburne declared before the Star Chamber that "no
man[']s conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed. " 90 Five years
later in the winter of 1641-1642, the governor of the Plymouth Colony
asked the colony's ministers and magistrates "[h]ow far a magistrate
may extract a confession from a delinquent to accuse himself of a capital crime seeing nemo tenetur prodere seipsum. " 91 One of the three sur86. THEODORE BARLOW, THE JUSTICE OF PEACE: A TREATISE CONTAINING
THE POWER AND DUIT OF THAT MAGISTRATE 189 (London, Henry Lintot 1745),
quoted in John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Selflncrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1085 n.157 (1994).
87. AUGUSTIN S. CLAYTON, THE OFFICE AND DUIT OF A JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE (Milledgeville, S. Grantland 1819), quoted in Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth:
Reconsidering the Constitutional Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1128 (1994).
88. See 1 THOMAS STARKIE, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 51-52 (Theron Metcalf ed., Boston, Wells & Lilly 1826).
89. Thomas Cartwright, Treatise on the Oath Ex Officio, in CARTWRIGHTIANA
33 (Albert Peel & Leland H. Carlson eds., 1951), quoted in LEVY, supra note 52, at
177.
90. John Lilburne, The Just Defence of John Lilburn, in THE LEVELLER TRACTS
1647-1653, at 450, 454 (Willjam Haller & Godfrey Davies eds., 1944) (containing
Lilburne's description of his Star Chamber prosecution, written at the time of his 1653
treason trial).
91. WILLIAM BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION, 1620-1647, at 407 (Samuel E. Morison ed., 1952).
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v1vmg responses exhibited little shyness about asking incriminating
questions of unswom suspects or about pressing these suspects through
"force of argument." It declared, however, that physical force, threats
of increased punishment, and interrogation under oath were all
impermissible:
l conceive that a magistrate is bound, by careful examination of circum-

stances and weighing of probabilities, to sift the accused; and by force of
argument to draw him to an acknowledgment of the truth. But he may
not extract a confession of a capital crime from a suspected person by
any violent means, whether it be by an oath imposed, or by any punishment inflicted or threatened to be inflicted, for so he may draw forth an
acknowledgment of a crime from a fearful innocent. If guilty, he shall be
compelled to be his own accuser, when no other can, which is against the
rule of justice.92

Summarizing the responses that the governor received, John
Winthrop saw two principles at work: first, a principle that one might
call "the Greenawalt principle," affording suspects 1:1 right to silence in
cases of light suspicion but not when a strong evidentiary basis for interrogation existed; and second, an unqualified prohibition of torture
and of requiring suspects to answer under oath:
[When a crime has been committed] and one witness or strong presumptions do point out the offender, there the judge may examine him strictly,
and he is bound to answer directly, though to the peril of his life. But if
there be only light suspicion, &c. then the judge is not to press him to
answer ... but he may be silent, and call for his accusers. But for examination by oath or torture in criminal cases, it was generally denied to be
lawful.93

92. Id. (response of Ralph Partrich). A second response condemned the oath ex officio and the infliction of punishment for failure to confess but emphasized that "[a]
magistrate cannot without sin neglect diligent inquisition into the cause brought before
him." This response added, "[I]f it be manifest that a capital crime is committed, and
that common report or probability, suspicion or some complaint (or the like), be of this
or that person, a magistrate ought to require, and by all due means to procure from the
person . . . a naked confession of the fact." The failure of a magistrate to fulfill this
duty would "betray his country and people to the heavy displeasure of God." Id. at
405-06 (response of John Rayner).
The third response condemned "extract[ing] a confession from a delinquent by an
oath in matters of life or death." Nevertheless, so long as the "presumptions are
strong" and the matters are "of highest consequence, such as do concern the safety or
ruin of states or countries, magistrates may proceed so far to bodily torments, as racks,
hot irons, etc. to extract a confession." Id. at 412-13 (response of Charles Chauncy).
For Charles Chauncy, later the.President of Harvard College, see id. at 314 n.4, placing
a suspect on oath apparently was more offensive than torture. Although torture was to
be used only sparingly in capital cases, interrogation under oath was impermissible.
93. 2 JOHN WINTHROP, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND 47 (J. Savage ed., 2d ed.,
Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1826). In 1637 the General Court of Massachusetts sum-
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In 1677 the Virginia House of Burgesses declared that forcing suspects
to answer incriminating questions under oath was incompatible with
their natural rights. In the aftermath of Bacon's Rebellion and its suppression, the House resolved "that a person summoned as a witnes
against another, ought to answer upon oath, but noe law can compell a
man to sweare against himselfe in any matter wherein he is lyable to
corporall punishment. "94
These sources and others discussed below support this judgment:
The Fifth Amendment privilege prohibited (1) incrimipating interrogation under oath, (2) torture,95 and (3) probably other forms of coercive
interrogation such as threats of future punishment and promises of leniency.96 The Amendment prohibited nothing more, or at least the sources

moned John Wheelwright to account for his unorthodox religious views. The General
Court assured him, however, that he would not be examineq "by any compulsory
means, as by oath, imprisonment, or the like." LEVY, supra note 52, at 342.
94. 2 STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 422 (William W. Hening ed., Richmond, The Franklin Press 1820).
95. Although John Langbein maintains doubtfully that England's prohibition of
torture was effected "before the first traces of the privilege at common law," Langbein,
supra note 86, at 1085, Americans of the founding generation unmistakably sa'Y{ th~
privilege as a safeguard against torture. See LEVY, supra note 52, at 430; Amar &
Lettow, supra note 32, at 865 n.20. In addition to the sources cited by these works, see
1 LEONARD MA.cNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 275
(Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1804) (declaring that one purpose of the privilege is to outlaw
torture). English sources similarly described the privilege as forbidding torture. See Sollom Emlyn, Preface to 1 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALs AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON iv·(2d ed., London, J. Walthoe 1730) ("In other Countries,
Racks and Instruments of Torture are applied to force from the Prisoner a Confession,
sometimes of more than is true; but this is a Practice which Englishmen are happily unacquainted with, enjoying the benefit of that just and reasonable Maxim, Nemo tenetur
accusare seipsum .... ") (footnote omitted); 1 JAMES FITZ.JAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 440 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883)
("[T]he assertion that the maxim, 'Nemo tenetur accusare seipsum,' was part of the law
of God and of nature ... was all the more popular because it condemned the practice of
torture for purposes of evidence, then in full use both on the Continent and in Scotland."). Herman, supra note 83, collects and discusses these sources at 178-79.
96. Under the common law of evidence, such threats and promises rendered outof-court confessions involuntary. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 19 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 12 (1979). Wigmore insisted that the law of voluntariness
developed independently of the principle nemo tenetur seipsum prodere. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2266. He assailed the Supreme Court for declaring in Bram v.
United States:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises
whether a confession is inco_mpetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled
by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 823, at 337 n.2.
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mention nothing more. 97 The Self-Incrimination Clause neither mandated an accusatorial system nor afforded defendants a right to remain
silent. It focused upon improper methods of gaining information from
criminal suspects.
If this understanding of the original understanding is correct, critics
of the Fifth Amendment privilege have missed the mark. Although the
intensity of the framers' disapproval of sworn statements by suspects
may seem foreign to us today, the policies that informed the privilege
were coherent and compelling, and they were· not in t~nsion with ordinary morality. When Ann has a strong basis for suspecting that Betty
has stolen her property, ordinary morality may permit Ann to interrogate Betty and to draw an adverse inference if she refuses to respond.
Ordinary morality, however, does not permit Ann to place Betty on the
rack or to insist that Betty swear upon threat of imprisonment for falsehood or silence that her explanation is true. When critics have spoken
harshly of the privilege against self-incrimination, they have assumed
that it afforded more than a right to be free of inhuman methods of inRecently, however, Lawrence Herman noted several occasions in the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries when treatise writers, courts, counsel, and a
member of the House of Lords described the requirement that guilty pleas and other
confessions be voluntary as one incident of the nemo tenetur principle. See Herman,
supra note 83, at 143-47, 152-53, 168-69. Herman advanced other reasons for doubting
Wigmore's claim that the privilege and the requirement of voluntariness were entirely
independent of one another, including the fact that both doctrines were described as forbidding torture. See id. at 177-80. Charles McCormick once remarked that although the
two doctrines had arisen at different times, the kinship between them was "too apparent
for denial." Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16
TuxAs L. REV. 447, 453 (1938).
Even if, as Wigmore claimed, "the privilege" antedated the requirement of voluntariness by 100 years, the requirement that confessions be voluntary antedated the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., R. v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161 (K.B. 1775). The Framers of
the Fifth Amendment might well have assumed that their prohibition of "compulsion"
to incriminate oneself included a requirement that confessions be "uncompelled" or
voluntary. There is little reason to suppose that the unqualified language of the Fifth
Amendment and of other American formulations of the privilege merely reiterated the
traditional English understanding of the nemo tenetur principle (whether the Americans
knew that they were innovating or not). Wigmore's view notwithstanding, the reading of
the Fifth Amendment offered by Bram v. United States seems at least plausible both
textually and historically.
97. In seeking the target of an unqualified privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, moreover, inhuman methods of interrogation seem a more promising candidate than the ability to ask questions and expect answers from people accused of
crime. Henry Hart and Albert Sacks once wrote that in seeking the meaning of an ambiguous or unclear legislative c;:nactrnent, one should "assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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terrogation. They have assumed that it afforded a right to silence - a
right not to respond to incriminating questions at an. The evidence,
however, is overwhelming that the privilege did not afford this right at
the time that it appeared in the Bill of Rights.
What the Fifth Amendment privilege did not prohibit is in fact
clearer than what it did. The privilege did not prohibit the forceful incriminating interrogation of suspects by judges and magistrates so long
as the suspects remained unswom. Unswom suspects who refused to respond to the questions of English and American courts .doubtless would
have suffered no more severe sanction than the drawing of an adverse
inference.98 The procedures of the prenineteenth-century trial, however,
would have made that disadvantage substantial in every case and devastating in most. The privilege did not afford suspects a right to suffer no
consequences for their refusal to speak.99
98. One cannot know much, however, about what common law judges would have
done if unsworn defendants had refused to answer, for during the centuries prior to the
Bill of Rights, almost none did. One who did - the first, apparently - was John
Udall. When Udall was tried for seditious libel in 1590, the court invited the jury to
consider his silence as evidence of his guilt. He was convicted and sentenced to death,
and he died in prison. See LEVY, supra note 52, at 168-70; Herman, supra note 83, at
120-21.
The most prominent of the common-law defendants to assert a right to silence was
John Lilbume, the most famous of the Levellers. Lilbume earlier had objected to ex officio proceedings in the Court of Star Chamber, although he had declined to answer
only questions concerning unspecified charges. During his common law trial for treason
in 1649, he claimed many nonexistent rights. When Lilburne refused to say at his trial
whether he had written a particular document, the attorney general quarreled with him.
Other proof of Lilburne's authorship was at hand, however, and the court imposed no
formal sanction for his refusal. Trial of John Lilbume, 4 How. St. Tr. 1269, 1340-41
(1649).
At his arraignment, Lilbume declared, "[B]y the Laws of England, I am not to answer questions against or concerning myself," and the presiding judge replied, "You
shall not be compelled." 4 How. St. Tr. at 1292-93. This response should not be read as
an expression of the court's approval of Lilbume's claim or as a promise that no inference would be drawn from his failure to respond. The statement might simply have recognized that English law authorized no formal, judicially imposed punishment when a
person who had not been summoned or sworn as a witness declined to speak. Lilbume
was subject to the same informal pressure to speak as other defendants, and he did not
remain at all silent at his trial.
With very few exceptions, only suspects brought before the prerogative courts and
other sworn witnesses ever invoked the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere. As
Lawrence Herman suggests, a common law defendant who remained silent during a
pretrial examination would have been denied bail, and silence before or during trial
would have been called to the attention of the trier of fact. See Herman, supra note 83,
at 124 (citing JOHN H. LANG~EIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 11
(1974)).
99. The imposition of formal sanctions for silence might have been regarded as
"torture" forbidden by the privilege, but there is a difference between withholding punishment for conduct and approval of that conduct. Although a suspect might have a
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John Langbein has distinguished between two historic models of
the criminal trial: the "accused speaks" trial and the "testing the prosecution" trial. 100 He argues that the transformation of the "accused
speaks" trial into the "testing the prosecution" trial began in the late
eighteenth century when lawyers came to represent defendants in significant numbers. So long as defendants were unrepresented, no one could
speak for them unless they spoke for themselves. In this situation, a
right to remain silent would have been a right to commit suicide.
Langbein notes that several other aspects of common law procedure
also induced defendants to speak, 101 and the evidence is clear that in the
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries virtually all English defendants did speak. 102 One source described the criminal trial as an "altercation" between the defendant and his accusers. 103
Trial, moreover, was not the only stage of the criminal process at
which the accused was expected to speak. The Marian Committal
Statute of 1555 required justices of the peace to interrogate suspects
following their apprehension and to record anything ~•materiall to prove
the felonie." 104 Until the mid-eighteenth century, the record of the
defendant's pretrial examination was read routinely at her trial. 105 Courts
then began to express a preference for hearing the defendant's account
from the defendant herself, but the record of her pretrial examination
remained available for impeachment purposes. If the defendant said
something different at trial from what she had told the magistrate, the
jury heard about it. 106
Eben Moglen has reported that American criminal procedure
throughout the colonial period and into the early republic corresponded

right not to be imprisoned for refusing to answer, his refusal to answer might nevertheless be considered wrongful.
100. Langbein, supra note 86, at 1048.
101. See id. at 1055-66.
102. See J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at
348-49 (1986) ("There was no thought that the prisoner had a right to remain silent on
the grounds that he would otherwise be liable to incriminate himself.... [T]he assumption was clear that if the case against him was false the prisoner ought to say so and
suggest why, and that if he did not speak that could only be because he was unable to
deny the truth of the evidence.").
·
103. See Langbein, supra note 86, at 1049 (quoting THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM, bk. 2, ch. 23, at 114 (Mary Dewar ed., Cambridge University Press
1982) (1583, written circa 1565)).
104. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ell. 10 (Eng.).
· 105. The defendant's statement often was read by the justice of the peace himself;
this judicial officer frequently appeared as a witness against the defendant. See
Langbein, supra note 86, at 1059-61.
106. See id. at 1060 n.58.

/
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to the "accused speaks" model. 107 Moglen offers little direct evidence
concerning the defendant's role at trial (little evidence seems to survive), but he does demonstrate that the Marian procedure was firmly in
place. Justices of the Peace throughout America interrogated unsworn
defendants, and these defendants' statements were used at trial. 108
In England, lawyers were first permitted to represent criminal defendants in ordinary felony trials in the 1730s, and according to
Langbein, "[t]he use of defense counsel remained a relative trickle for
another half century, until the 1780s." 109 Within another half century,
however, counsel had begun to work a substantial change in English
criminal procedure. As early as 1820, the French visitor Charles Cottu
wrote of the English trial: "[T]he defendant acts no kind of part: his hat
stuck on a pole might without inconvenience be his substitute." 11 Cottu
may have exaggerated, however, for "accused speaks" procedures apparently persisted into the 1820s and even the 1830s. 111 Criminal defendants had no right to remain silent until well into the nineteenth
century.
·
Langbein argues that "the purpose of the [early] rule denying defense counsel was ... diametrically opposed to the purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination," 112 that "[t]he privilege against selfincrimination is the creature of defense counsel," 113 and that "the real
origins of the privilege against self-incrimination" are to be found in
the decades in which "defense counsel broke up the 'accused speaks'
trial." 114 These statements are accurate if, when Langbein refers to "the
privilege against self-incrimination," he means "the right to remain silent" (as he seems to) .. The statements are not accurate, however, if
Langbein means the privilege against self-incrimination that the Framers included in the Bill of Rights. This privilege was not the product of

°

107. Moglen, supra note 87, at 1089.
108. Id. at 1094-99; see also JULIUS GOEBEL. JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON.
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YoRK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 652-59 (1944) (demonstrating the use at trial of confessions before magistrates
and inferring that defendants in colonial New York were "directly vulnerable to que$tioning from the bench").
109. See Langbein, supra note 86, at 1068. A statute in 1696 had permitted defense counsel to appear in treason trials_.
110. CHARLES Corru. ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
ENGLAND 73 (1822) (translation of DE L'ADMINISTRATION DE LA JUSTICE
CRIMINELLE EN ANGLETERRE (1820)).
111. See Henry Smith, The Modern Privilege: Its Nineteenth Century Origins, in
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
(R.H. Helmholz ed., forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with the author).
112. Langbein, supra note 86, at 1054.
113. Id. (emphasis omitted).
114. Id. at 1069.
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lawyer-dominated trials or of the disappearance of "accused speaks"
procedures. 115
Congress submitted the Bill of Rights to the states in 1789, at the
end of the decade in which, Langbein reports, defense attorneys first
appeared in English criminal trials in significant numbers. In J.M.
Beattie's estimate, lawyers represented nearly twenty percent of the defendants tried in the Old Bailey a few years before Congress's submission of the Fifth Amendment to the states, 116 and representation by
counsel was rarer in America than in England. 117 Moi;eover, the Fifth
Amendment's formulation of the privilege was not new; similar declara.tions had appeared in a number of state constitutions. 118 Indeed, in
1776, just prior to American independence, the Virginia Declaration of
Rights had listed among the defendant's privileges, "[n]or can he be
compelled to give evidence against himself." 119 At this time, even in
London, only about two percent of all felony defendants were represented by counsel, 120 and only about 180 residents of the American colonies were lawyers in the sense that they had been trained at the Inns of
Court. 121 The privilege against self-incrimination articulated by the Bill
of Rights and by American state constitutions could not have been
driven by lawyer-dominated trials.
Noting that "accused speaks" procedures existed side-by-side with
constitutional declarations of the privilege against self-incrimination,
Eben Moglen maintains that "Americans did not feel themselves immediately compelled to put their principles into practice." 122 The odds,

115. At the conclusion of his essay, Langbein acknowledges that in denying the
existence of the privilege against self-incrimination until the emergence of the Iawyerdominated trial, he has spoken in "a shorthand of sorts." Id. at 1084.
116. See J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 227
(1991).
117. See, e.g., GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 108, at 573 (revealing that
"counsel was only occasionally employed in criminal cases" in eighteenth century New
York); PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 86
(1992) ("[B]y the 1760s, counsel was permitted felony suspects in more than half the
colonies.") (emphasis added); LEVY, supra note 52, at 369; John M. Murrin, The Legal
Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS. AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 540 (Stanley N.
Katz & John M. Murrin eds., 1983).
118. See Moglen, supra note 87, at 1118-21.
119. 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 3813
(Scholarly Press 1977) (1909), quoted in Moglen, supra note 87, at 1118.
120. Beattie, supra note 116, at 227 (tbl. 1).
121. LEVY, supra note 52, at 369.
122. Moglen, supra note 87, at 1111-12.
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however, seem against this hypothesis. Legal systems sometimes are
false to their ideals - as this article has contended that ours is when it
combines lofty accusatorial rhetoric with tawdry interrogation and plea
bargaining practices. 123 Nevertheless, people usually attempt to rationalize their practices in terms of their ideals. That the Framers of the Constitution articulated constitutional principles without advertence to the
fact that these principles were flatly inconsistent with their everyday
practices seems unlikely. A more promising hypothesis is that the Framers saw no tension between their courtroom procedures and the principles that they declared in the Constitution.
If someone had argued to judges of the founding generation that
their "accused speaks" procedures violated the privilege against selfincrimination, they might have offered any or all of three responses.
These responses would have denied each and every element of a violation of the privilege:
First, far from compelling any defendant to be a witness against himself,
we do not permit any defendant to be a witness against (or for) himself.
The defendant is disqualified from giving evidence partly because we are
concerned that placing him on oath would be incompatible with his
privilege. 124
Second, if our procedures compel defendants to do anything, it is not to
incriminate themselves. We do not press defendants to admit their guilt.
To the contrary, we want to hear anything that they may be able to say in
their defense. When an occasional defendant attempts to plead guilty, we
in fact discourage him. 125 If there is any tilt to our procedures, we press
defendants to exculpate rather than to incriminate themselves.
Third, our procedures do not in fact compel anyone to do anything. If a
defendant were to refuse to respond to judicial questions or to the
charges against him, we would impose no punishment for his refusal. We
would merely permit the jury to draw whatever inference seemed appropriate in determining whether he was guilty of the offense with which he

123. See supra text accompanying notes 36-47.
124. Perhaps judges of the early American republic would not have pressed this
response too hard. True, the resolution of the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1677 declared that "noe law can compell a man to sweare against himselfe in any matter
wherein he is lyable to corporal! punishment"; the Virginia Declaration of Rights proclaimed a century later, "[N]or can he be compelled to give evidence against himself";
and the federal Bill of Rights provided, "No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." One doubts, however, that the authors of these
provisions would have limited the privilege to sworn statements if the statements of an
unsworn defendant who had been tortured were offered at his trial.
125. See Alschuler, supra note 96, at 7-13; see also BEATTIE. supra note 102, at
336-37, 446-47.
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was charged. Pennitting a jury to draw a fair inference is a far cry from
torture, placing a defendant upon oath, or any other form of compulsion.

None of these judicial responses would have been plausible if defendants had been examined under oath. Then the defendant would have
been a witness; he would have been subject to compulsion (the punishment for perjury) if he failed to speak the truth; and if the truth were incriminating, his oath would have pressed him to incriminate himself.
Some early sources emphasized that placing a suspect under oath
tempted him to commit perjury. The principal· concern .of these sources
was to prevent what modem lawyers would call entrapment - that officials might prompt a suspect to commit a crime that he would have
avoided in the absence of the officials' enticing conduct. The new
crime, moreover, would be perjury, an offense that would not only subject the suspect to temporal punishment but also jeopardize his soul.
Other sources referred to the oath as compulsion, a form of "violence" akin to torture. Their concern appeared to be, not that the suspect would be induced to commit perjury, but rather that he would be
compelled by improper methods to confess his crime. Concerns about
tempting suspects to commit perjury may in fact have blended with
concerns about compelling them to incriminate themselves; the choice
among perjury, contempt, and self-incrimination was indeed a "cruel
trilemma." 126
Whatever their reasons, the manuals for justices of the peace in
England and America consistently emphasized that the suspect was not
to be sworn when examined. 127 In two eighteenth-century English cases,
justices of the peace overlooked the manuals' admonitions and administered oaths to suspects before examining them. In both cases, judges excluded the suspects' statements from evidence at trial. In one case, the
judge remarked, "If [the examination] is upon Oath it cannot be read,
for Persons are not to swear against themselves; all Examinations ought
to be taken freely and voluntarily, and not upon Oath, and then we can
read them." 128 A pamphlet report of the second case explained:

126. See 1 SIMON GREENLEAF. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 225,
at 262-63 (Boston, Charles C. Little & °James Brown 1842) (explaining why a pretrial
statement made under oath cannot be considered voluntary and linking the testimonial
disqualification of defendants both to the nemo tenetur principle and to the concern that
defendants should not be tempted to commit perjury).
127. See, e.g., A NEW CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 158 (Albany, D. & s. Whiting
1803); see also Moglen, supra note 87, at 1098.
128. 4 Selected Trials at the Sessions - House in the Old - Bailey 26-27 (photo. reprint 1985) (1742) (trial of Sarah Malcolm, O.B.S.P. (Feb. 4, 1733)); see also Langbein,
supra note 86, at 1079 n. 142 (describing the trial).
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[T]he confession was produced; but it being taken on oath, it could not
be read. If it had been taken voluntarily it would have been admitted as
good evidence; but the law supposes that an oath is compulsion; and consequently that no man is obliged to swear against himself in cases where
it affects his life.129

The courts' unwillingness to receive sworn, self-incriminating testimony explains what otherwise would seem a paradox: that witnesses for
the prosecution and witnesses in civil cases were much more likely to
invoke the privilege - and to do so successfully - than criminal defendants.130 Unlike defendants, prosecution witnesses and witnesses in
civil cases were sworn, and when they invoked the privilege, the courts
forbade other trial participants from asking them incriminating questions. At least by 1700, both sworn defendants in religious courts and
sworn witnesses in common law courts were permitted to decline to answer any questions that could lead to criminal punishment or forfeiture.131 Once a witness was sworn, he was subject to compulsion, and
his only protection lay in the ability to decline to answer specific questions. The protection of common law defendants, by contrast, lay in not
being sworn at all.
Eben Moglen offers persuasive evidence that American courts did
not view the answers of unsworn defendants in the same light as those
of sworn witnesses. 132 Following ratification of the Fifth Amendment,
some American lawyers began to object on nonconstitutional grounds to
the pretrial interrogation of defendants by justices of the peace. These
lawyers noted that, although American law generally incorporated the
common law of England, it did not, in the absence of legislative provision to the contrary, incorporate English statutory law. Because the pretrial examination of defendants was authorized by a statute, the Marian
Committal Statute of 1555, the lawyers contended that American law
did not allow this procedure.
Neither the lawyers nor the commentators who advanced this argument supplemented it with a claim that the pretrial examination of suspects violated either the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination or the similar provisions of state constitutions. If anyone
had thought that the Constitution guaranteed a right to remain silent or
129. BEATIIE. supra note 102, at 365 n.129 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This case is also described in Langbein, supra note 86, at 1079 n.142.
130. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 86, at 1078-80.
131. See 8 WIGMORE. supra note 4, § 2250, at 284, 289-90. In the trial of Sir
John Freind, 13 How. St. Tr. 1, 17 (1696), Lord Chief Justice Treby said of a witness,
"no man is bound to answer any questions that will subject him to a penalty or to
infamy."
132. See Moglen, supra note 87, at 1126-27.
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that "accused speaks" procedures were inconsistent with the privilege,
this would have been the occasion to say so. During three decades of
debate over whether the Marian Committal Statute was a Parliamentary
innovation or merely declarative of the common law, however, no one
did. Even the opponents of "accused speaks" procedures did not consider them inconsistent with the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination.

C.

You Have a Right to Remain

Silen~

The transformation of the privilege into a right of criminal defendants to remain silent occurred only during the nineteenth century. Lawyerization of the trial contributed to a changed ideology of criminal procedure - one in which the dignity of defendants lay not in their ability
to tell their stories fully, but rather in their ability to remain passive, to
proclaim to the prosecutor "Thou sayest," and to force the state to
shoulder the entire load. As defendants participated less in the proceedings that determined their fate, they were seen more as objects or as
targets of the coercive forces of the state.
In Parliamentary debates of the 1820s and 1830s, reformers complained that "accused speaks" procedures often worked unfairly. Many
defendants were not sufficiently educated and articulate to tell their stories coherently. The remedy that the reformers sought, however, was not
the declaration of a right to remain silent; instead, they proposed giving
defense attorneys the power to argue on the defendants' behalf before
juries. The expansion of the role of counsel which they secured in 1836
permitted defendants to take a still more passive role at trial and contributed to the rapidly changing ideology of English procedure. 133
An 1838 opinion declared that "[a] prisoner is not to be entrapped
into making any statement" and that a magistrate should advise this
suspect before taking his statement "that what he thinks fit to say will
be taken down, and may be used against him on his trial." 134 A clearer
doctrinal recognition of the right to remain silent came ten years later in
Sir John Jervis's Act. This Act provided that, before the pretrial examination, the accused should be cautioned that he need not answer and
that if he did answer, his answers cou1abe used against him at trial. 135
In New York City, magistrates hegan routinely to caution defendants in

133. See Smith, supra note 111, at 24-29.
134. R. v. Arnold, 173 Eng. Rep. 645, 645-46 (K.B. 1838).
135. See 11 & 12 Viet., ch. 42, § 18 (1848) (Eng.).

August 1996]

A Peculiar Privilege

2661

1835, the number of defendants who declined to submit to pretrial interrogation increased thereafter. 136
A more significant doctrinal development than the magistrates'
cautioning of suspects was the abolition of the testimonial disqualification of defendants. In 1864 Maine became the first American jurisdiction to allow defendants to offer sworn testimony in criminal cases, 137
and other states quickly followed. The British Parliament, a latecomer
to the movement, enacted its competency statute in 1898. 138 By the end
of the nineteenth century, Georgia was the only Americ~ state to retain
the common law disqualification. It did not permit defendants to offer
sworn testimony until 1962. 139
The statutes that ended the testimonial disqualification of defendants were controversial, and the controversy centered on constitutional
issues. 140 Proponents maintained that defendants should have the same
right as other witnesses to testify under oath and that the common law
disqualification substituted a presumption of perjury for the presumption of innocence. 141 Opponents contended, however, that the statutes
threatened the privilege against self-incrimination. 142 They argued that
jurors would view the failure of a lawyer to call his client to the witness
stand as a confession of the client's guilt and that the jurors would draw
this inference regardless of whatever cautionary instructions they received. In practice, defendants would be pressed to take the oath; they
would be subject to precisely the compulsion that state and federal constitutions condemned. 143 Many defendants, moreover, would respond by
committing perjury. Sir James Stephen wrote, "[I]t is not in human nature to speak the truth under such pressure as would be brought to bear

136. See Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, The Rise of Guilty Pleas: New York,

1800-1865, 22 J.L. & SOCY. 443, 452 (1995).
137. See Act of Mar. 25, 1864, ch. 280, 1864 Me. Laws 214 (codified as amended
at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (West 1994)).
138. The Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, 61 & 62 Viet., ch. 36 (Eng.).
139. See GA. CODE ANN.§§ 24-9-20, 17-7-28 (Michie 1995).
140. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1961); Joel N. Bodansky,
The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualijic{ltjgn: An Historical Survey, 70 KY. L.J.
91, 115 (1981-82).
141. Perhaps the earliest and certfilnly one of the most earnest proponents of this
position was Jeremy Bentham. See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 381-90, 393-97 (Garland repr. 1978) (1827).
142. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 578-80; Bodansky, supra note 140, at 115.
143. See, e.g., Seth Ames, Testimony of Persons Accused of Crime, 1 AM. L. REv.
443, 444 (1867) ("In its actual workings, it will be found that this new statute will inevitably compel the defendant to testify, and will have substantially the same effect as if
it did not go through the mockery of saying that he might testify if he pleased."). I am
grateful to George Fisher for this reference.
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on the prisoner, and it is not a light thing to institute a system which
would almost enforce perjury on every occasion." 144
In deference to constitutional concerns, most competency statutes,
including the federal statute of 1878, 145 provided that the prosecutor
could not comment on the failure of a defendant to testify and that no
presumption against the defendant would arise from his failure to take
the stand. 146 Some courts later suggested that the statutes would have
been invalid without these provisions. 147 Placing defendants under oath
144. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 202 (London and Cambridge, MacMillan & Co. 1863); see Ames, supra
note 143, at 448 ("The guilty ... will add the crime of perjury to the crime set forth in
the indictment. Even of the innocent, some, under the influence of terror and anxiety,
may mix some falsehood with the truth, and so increase the embarrassment and aggravate the damages of their position.").
145. Act of Mar. 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1994)).
146. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 580; Bodansky, supra note 140, at 126.
147. See Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213, 222 (1871); Stapl~s v. State, 14 S.W. 603
(Tenn. 1890); Price v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 393, 395 (1883) (indicating that without
the no-comment provision, the competency statute would have been incompatible with
the presumption of innocence); State v. Taylor, 50 S.E. 247, 249-50 (W. Va. 1905);
Bodansky, supra note 140, at 126.
The first competency statute, which was enacted in Maine, did not include a provision forbidding adverse comment on a defendant's failure to testify. The Maine Supreme Court not only upheld the constitutionality of this statute but also held that the
privilege against self-incrimination did not preclude juries from considering a defendant's failure to testify as evidence of his guilt. See State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 (1867).
The court noted that "[f]rom time immemorial the ... silence of the accused person,
when charged, has been regarded as legitimate evidence" and that "refusals to account
for the possession of stolen property, are evidences of guilt admitted." 55 Me. at 217.
Ignoring an important limitation that a treatise writer included in his description of the
circumstances in which an inference from silence was appropriate, the court quoted this
description in support of its ruling: " 'Where a man at full liberty to speak and not in
the course of a judicial inquiry is charged with a crime, and remains silent, that is,
makes no denial of the accusation by word or gesture, his silence is a circumstance
which may be left to the jury.' .. 55 Me. at 218 (citing WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
320) (emphasis added).
The court did not advert to the distinction between drawing an adverse inference
from the silence of an unswom person, which the privilege against self-incrimination
never had precluded, and pressing a person to answer incriminating questions under
oath, which it had. See also State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 301 (1871) (Appleton, CJ.)
("Extrajudicial non-responsion, when a charge .is_Jllade, is always regarded as an article
of circumstantial evidence.... Is [the defendant's] silence of any less probative force,
when thus in court called upon to contradict or explain ... ?"). In 1879, the Maine legislature, "looking for a more careful protection" of the privilege against selfincrimination than the state's supreme court had provided, see State v. Banks, 78 Me.
490, 492 (1886), declared that a defendant's failure to testify should not be treated as
evidence of his guilt. See Me. Stat. 1879, ch. 92, § 6. The Maine court later declared,
"We think the intent of the statute is that the jury, in determining their verdict, shall entirely exclude from their consideration the fact that the defendant did not elect to testify,
substantially as if the law did not allow him to be a witness.'' Banks, 78 Me. at 492. I
am grateful to George Fisher for leading me to the Maine sources.
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apparently was constitutional only because defendants were thought to
have an unfettered option to decline to take the witness stand without
suffering any consequence.
Some competency statutes expressly preserved the defendant's
power to make an unsworn statement to the jury. Following the English
Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, for example, defendants were allowed
either to testify from the witness stand or to make an unsworn statement
from the prisoner's dock. The sense that unsworn statements were
worthless, however, led Parliament to abolish the option of speaking
from the dock in 1982. 148 Most American jurisdictions had reached the
same conclusion long before. Today, Massachusetts may still allow defendants to decide whether to offer sworn or unsworn statements, 149 but
no other state gives defendants this option.
Following the enactment of competency statutes, the law in some
jurisdictions technically might have been that, although jurors could
draw no lawful inference from a defendant's failure to testify under
oath, they could lawfully consider the defendant's failure to make an
unsworn statement. 150 This distinction, however, was too thin to be
maintained. When defendants, in practice, spoke only from the witness
stand and when jurors were forbidden to draw an inference from their
failure to take the stand, defendants had a right to remain silent at trial.
In 1965 Griffin v. California held that prosecutorial or judicial
comment on a defendant's failure to testify violated the Fifth Amendment privilege. 151 The Framers of the Fifth Amendment, who might not
have approved of sworn testimony by defendants at all, probably would
have agreed that a defendant's refusal to submit to the compulsion of an
oath could not be the subject of adverse comment. Griffin, however,
forbade comment not simply on the refusal of a defendant to submit to
an oath, but "on the accused's silence. " 152 The Court offered no indication that refusal to submit to an oath might differ from any other form
of silence, and one year after Griffin, the Court extended the right to remain silent to unsworn suspects in custody in Miranda v. Arizona. That
the presence or absence of an oath might have made a difference
seemed inconceivable in 1966. Because an unsworn statement made in

148. See Criminal Justice Act, 1982, ch. 48, § 72 (Eng.).
149. It has been seventy years, however, since the Supreme Judicial Court's last
reiteration of the defendant's ability to offer an unswom statement. See Commonwealth
v. Stewart, 151 N.E. 74 (Mass. 1926).
150. In other jurisdictions, the ability to make an unswom statement did not survive the enactment of competency statutes. See Bodansky, supra note 140, at 117 n.113.
151. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
152. 380 U.S. at 615.
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response to police interrogation would be used against a suspect at trial,
it was the "functional equivalent" of testimony. The distinction between sworn and unswom statements, central to the framers' understanding of what it meant to be compelled to testify, had disappeared.
In 1987 Rock v. Arkansas held that the Constitution guaranteed defendants a right to testify under oath 153 - a right the framers might
have characterized as the right to be compelled. Turning the original understanding of the constitutional privilege on its head, the Supreme
Court declared, "The opportunity to testify is ~ .. a ne<;:essary corollary
to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony." 154
In the years since Miranda, Americans have seemed increasingly
enamored of its accusatorial rhetoric, especially as they have learned
that Miranda's system for protecting the Fifth Amendment privilege has
little practical effect. 155 During the Reagan administration, the Justice
Department proposed abandoning Miranda, 156 but its proposal generated
considerable criticism even among police administrators. 157
England, by contrast, has reassessed the value of "testing the prosecution" trials. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 provides that, once an accused has been warned of the consequences of a
failure to testify, "the court or jury ... may draw such inferences as
appear proper from the failure of the accused to give evidence." 158 In
153. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
154. 483 U.S. at 52. The Court's logic was no stronger than its history. Denying
an opportunity to testify ensures that testimony will not be compelled. To say that a person cannot be compelled to do what she is not permitted to do may be odd, but the
Fifth Amendment plainly did forbid compelling defendants to be witnesses against
themselves at a time when they were not permitted to be witnesses against themselves.
The protections of the Fifth Amendment, however, were not limited to criminal defendants. They extended to witnesses who could offer self-incriminating testimony if they
chose. The Court in Rock may have overlooked this fact when it made the statement
quoted in the text.
155. Compare Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387 (1996) and Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L.
REv. 839 (1996) with Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect, supra note 6; George C.
Thomas III, ls Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical
Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996); George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the
Miranda Empirical Debate: A "Steady-State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REv.
933 (1996).
.
156. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
ATIORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION (1986).
157. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Fifth Amendment at Justice: A Reply, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 950, 954 (1987).
158. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, § 35 (Eng.). The Criminal Procedure Act of Norway provides that a criminal defendant need not respond to the
charges against him when the state's attorney reads these charges at the outset of his
trial. Nevertheless, "[i]f the person charged refuses to answer, or states that he reserves
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addition, the Act invites jurors and judges to draw inferences from the
pretrial silence of defendants. 159 The Act encourages suspects to cooperate with police investigations, to disclose defenses at the earliest opportunity, and to submit to cross-examination at trial, but its supporters
contend that it is consistent with the privilege against self-incrimination
because it does not treat a suspect's failure to speak as a crime or as
contempt of court. 160
The European Court of Human Rights will decide whether the
1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act violates England's obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights to give every
defendant a fair trial. Past decisions make it doubtful that the Act will
survive this scrutiny. 161 After centuries of self-congratulation by English
judges and lawyers who have denigrated the "inquisitorial" practices of
the European continent, continental judges may take ironic pleasure in
denouncing England's "inquisitorial" procedure.
Eben Moglen observes, "[T]he history of the privilege reveals how
procedure makes substance, and how legal evolution~ like natural selection itself, adapts old structures to new functions." 162 More than the adaptation of old doctrines to new functions, however, the history of the
privilege against self-incrimination seems to reveal the tyranny of slogans. Shorthand phrases have taken on lives of their own. 163 These
phrases have eclipsed the goals of the doctrines that they purported to
describe and even the texts that embodied these doctrines. The phrases
and the images they evoked - what the phrases "sounded like" shaped the law. Latin maxims declaring that "no one shall be compelled to betray himself:' have sounded like the declaration that "no
his answer, the president of the court may inform him that this may be considered to
tell against him." The Criminal Procedure Act of Norway, Ch. 9, § 93 (1991) (unofficial English translation), quoted in William T. Pizzi, Punishment and Procedure: A Different View of the American Criminal Justice System, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 55, 61
(1996).
159. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, §§ 34, 36, 37 (Eng.); see
generally Ian Dennis, The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994: The Evidence
Provisions, 1995 CRIM. L. REv. 4; Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to
Silence and Moves Towards an inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402 (1994).
160. See Dennis, supra note 159, at 10.
161. See Funke v. Fr., App. No. 10828/84, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297 (1993) (Court
report). The 1994 Act was modeled in large part on the Criminal Evidence (Northern
Ireland) Order 1988, and the European Commission of Human Rights has concluded
that in many applications the Northern Ireland Order violates Article 6.1 of the European Convention. See Murray v. U.K., App. No. 18739/91, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. CDI
(Commn. Supp. 1994) (Commission report).
162. Moglen, supra note 87, at 1090.
163. Some scholars call this process "reification."
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one shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." The latter declaration has been summarized as "the privilege
against self-incrimination" (a description not generally in use before the
twentieth century 164 and one that omits all reference to the constitutional
concept of compulsion). The "privilege against self-incrimination," in
tum, has sounded like the "right to remain silent." Much of the history
of the privilege has been a story of slippage from one doctrine to another without awareness of the change. Officials appear to have drifted
from limiting the burdens of the religious obligation to confess in the
interest of obtaining more confessions to condemning incriminating interrogation under oath without adequate evidentiary justification. They
have drifted from condemning interrogation under oath without eviden~
tiary justification to condemning torture and all incriminating interrogation of suspects under oath. The officials then have drifted to a judgment that the framers of all of the earlier doctrines unques_tionably
would have disapproved - that it is unfair to expect defendants on trial
and people arrested on probable cause to participate actively in the
criminal process by telling what they know. J6s
Linguistic confusion also may have affected historians of the privilege, and some of the apparent disagreement among them may have
arisen from the ambiguity of phrases like "the privilege against selfincrimination." When scholars like John H. Wigmore have concluded
that the privilege was in place in common law courts by the end of the
seventeenth century, they have meant, mostly, that sworn witnesses in
these courts could decline to answer questions on the ground that their
answers would incriminate them. 166 When, however, scholars like John
Langbein have maintained that the privilege did not come into effective
existence until more than a century later, they have meant, mostly, that
until the nineteenth century unsworn criminal defendants were expected
to answer questions both before trial and at trial.
It might be said that the historians have described two different
privileges that arose centuries apart, each of them treated as "the" priv-

164. See LEVY, supra note 52, at.xvi ("The familiar phrase of contemporary usage seems to be of twentieth-century vintage.").
165. Cf. Wigmore, supra note 32, at 71 ("If one instance better than another
serves to exemplify the manner in which history may cover up the origin of a legal
principle, destroy all traces of its real significance, change and recast its purpose and its
use, while preserving an identify of form . . . it is this rule that no man shall be compelled to criminate himself.").
166. The number of cases recognizing this privilege of sworn witnesses may not
have been large, but in the absence of any cases after 1700 rejecting the privilege, they
are sufficiently numerous to justify the historians' conclusion.
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ilege against self-incrimination. 167 Sworn witnesses were privileged not
to answer incriminating questions by the end of the seventeenth century, and criminal defendants gained recognition of their right to remain
silent approximately 150 years later.
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?

The history of the privilege against self-incrimination seems to
pose its own "cruel trilemma" for American .courts. One possible option for modem courts is to return to the original understanding of the
Fifth Amendment with its strong distinction between sworn and unswom statements. In our era, however, the fires of hell have smoldered.
Oaths have lost their terror and even their meaning. Bruce Ackerman,
moreover, has pointed to a number of "constitutional moments" that
have effectively altered the Constitution without formal amendment. 168
The enactment of statutes ending the testimonial disqualification of defendants was, if not a constitutional moment, at least a constitutional
nanosecond. In a very different world from that of the early American
republic, restoring the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment
privilege is impossible.
If the distinction between sworn and unswom statements cannot be
maintained today, two options remain. One is to treat sworn statements
in the same way that eighteenth century English and American courts
treated unswom statements - by strongly encouraging them and by
drawing adverse inferences when defendants fail to provide them.
England, in effect, chose this option in the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act of 1994, which authorized judges and jurors to draw such adverse inferences in many situations. The second option is to treat unswom statements in the same way that eighteenth century courts treated
sworn statements - with wariness if not complete disapproval. At least
on paper, the United States Supreme Court chose this option for defendants in custody in Miranda v. Arizona.
If the United States were now to follow England's lead, which
seems extremely unlikely, it would treat sworn statements in the same
manner that the framers of the Fifth Amendment treated unswom state167. The historians may have been misled by the assumption that criminal defendants ought to have been the principal beneficiaries of the privilege against selfincrimination. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the principal benefit that defendants derived from the privilege was that they were not expected or permitted to give sworn testimony; accordingly, they could not be punished formally for false answers or for remaining silent. Modern historians have had difficulty seeing the lack of an oath as a
significant benefit.
168. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
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ments. Just as the framers expected defendants to speak at trial, courts
would now expect them to testify. Griffin v. California would be overruled along with Miranda. The privilege would remain a safeguard
against torture and other forms of coercive interrogation, although not
against the coercion once thought inherent in the oath. As a concession
to the past, courts might permit defendants to testify under oath but exempt their testimony from the penalties for perjury, confirming the de
facto exemption that prosecutors usually provide in practice. 169 With the
threat of secular penalties removed, the sworn statements of our era
might be no more the product of compulsion than the unsworn statements of the founders' era, and treating today's sworn statements like
the unsworn statements of the past might be the most accurate "translation" of the Framers' understanding. 170 This position might also be supported by reading the Fifth Amendment at the highest level of generality, by declaring that the word "compelled" invites each generation to
determine for itself what interrogation methods are offensive, and by
proclaiming that, in the final years of the twentieth century, requiring
someone to swear to tell the truth does not seem very much like torture.171 Still, one might be troubled by an interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment that, in one very clear sense, would afford less protection
to defendants than the Framers intended them to have.
The last alternative - treating unsworn statements by defendants
in the same way that the Framers treated sworn statements - might bar
sworn and unsworn statements from evidence altogether. At least it
would require suspects to make unfettered waivers of the right to remain silent whenever they responded to official inquiry. It also would
forbid fact finders from drawing adverse inferences from the failure of
defendants to answer. This solution, the one that Miranda adopted for

169. See VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUI'RAGE: THE FIVE REASONS WHY O.J. SIMP·
SON GOT AWAY WITH MURDER 173 (1996) ("[F)or the hundreds of thousands of defendants convicted every year throughout the land for various crimes, it is almost unheard of for there to follow, after their conviction, a prosecution against them for
perjury."). This informal exemption may stem Jess from sympathy for the defendant's
self-preservation efforts than from the limited practical utility of a perjury prosecution
following a criminal trial. When an app_arently perjurious defendant has been convicted
at trial, the sentence imposed for her offense is likely to make additional punishment
seem unnecessary. Indeed, the sentencing judge might have increased the defendant's
sentence because she apparently lied on the stand. See United States v. Grayson, 438
U.S. 41 (1978). When a defendant who may have testified falsely is acquitted, moreover, the likelihood of a successful perjury prosecution is ordinarily slim.
170. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1165
(1993).
171. Virtually all other readings of the Amendment could be supported in the
same way.
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suspects in police custody, is the worst alternative of all. It is likely to
be honored more on paper than in practice, and if taken seriously, it
would all but abandon defendants as an evidentiary resource. No sensible criminal justice system would pay this high price; no coherent ethical principle could explain why it should; and the architects of the
Constitution never imagined that the Fifth Amendment would be read to
demand it.
The history of the privilege against self-incrimination provides
only limited guidance in resolving the Fifth" Amendment issues that
confront modern courts. Recognition that the Amendment does not afford a right to remain silent or require an unfettered waiver of this right
whenever officials ask incriminating questions could lead to a reconsideration of Miranda, but history cannot tell judges what sorts of interrogation amount to compulsion under the Amendment. As Carol Steiker
has observed, "Our twentieth-century police and even our contemporary sense of 'policing' [would be] utterly foreign to our colonial forebears." 172 Nothing closely resembling stationhouse interrogation occurred at the time of the Fifth Amendment's framing.
The nearest analogue to police interrogation known to the Framers
was interrogation before a magistrate under the Marian Committal
Statute of 1555, 173 and for decades, people whose names "read[] like an
honor roll of the legal profession" - Wigmore, Pound, Kauper,
Friendly, Schaefer, Frankel, and others - have proposed a return to
something like the Marian procedure. 174 Pretrial interrogation before a
magistrate of the sort that they envision might require the magistrate to

172. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HAR.v. L.
REv. 820, 830 (1994); cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Fourth Amendment Remedies: The Current Understanding, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT
UNDERSTANDING 197 (Eugene W. Hickock, Jr. ed., 1991) ("Among the things that did
not exist at the time the Fourth Amendment became part of the Constitution were cocaine, heroin, helicopters, magnetometers, drug-detecting dogs, professional police
forces, and the exclusionary rule.").
173. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
174. The quoted phrase comes from Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 n.5
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which Justice Stevens commented in dissent that
"the roster of scholars and judges with reservations about expanding the Fifth Amendment privilege reads like an honor roll of the legal profession." See MARVIN E.
FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 98-99 (1980); SCHAEFER, supra note 32, at 77-81;
Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968); Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the
Accused - A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224 (1932); Roscoe
Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1014 (1934); Wigmore, supra note 32, at 85-88; see also Dripps,
supra note 32; Yale Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty
Years Later- Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REv. 15 (1974).
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find probable cause for a suspect's arrest before interrogation could begin. It might permit the suspect to be represented by counsel when her
statement is taken. It might bow to the original understanding of the
Fifth Amendment privilege by allowing the suspect to remain unsworn.
It might permit the magistrate or, perhaps, a prosecutor to question the
suspect, taking her statement in much the same manner that a lawyer
engaged in civil practice takes a deposition. This procedure might also
afford the suspect a reciprocal opportunity to obtain the statements of
prosecution witnesses. In 1980 Scotland reinstated its pretrial examination of defendants, and Scotland's experience might guide American
reform. 175
A suspect's answers to orderly questioning in a safeguarded courtroom environment should not be regarded as the product of compulsion.
These answers might tend to prove the suspect's guilt because they
were incriminating, seemed internally contradictory, rang untrue in certain details, or were inconsistent with the suspect's defense at trial.
Equally, the answers might tend to prove the suspect's innocence by
showing that she had denied her guilt promptly, in a manner consistent
with her trial defense, and in apparently forthcoming answers to specific questions. Interrogation before a judicial officer would be likely to
promote accurate fact-finding both when accurate fact-finding would
help the suspect and when it would hurt her. If the suspect refused to
answer, her refusal should be admissible at trial both because it would
have a rational bearing on her guilt and because its admission would

175. See Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1980, ch. 62, sec. 6(2); Neil Gow, The
Revival of Examinations, 141 New L.J. 680 (1991) (offering a less sanguine appraisal of
Scottish procedure than some Scottish judges and practitioners think justified). In
Scotland the examination occurs before a sheriff, the judicial officer who presides at
criminal trials in most serious cases. Most of the questioning is by a prosecutor. The accused is not sworn and usually is represented by counsel. He may confer with counsel
before answering any question, and counsel may supplement the record by asking clarifying questions of the accused. Questions focus not only on the accuracy of the charges
and the availability of defenses but also on the accuracy of any statements that the accused has given to the police and the circumstances in which the statements were made.
The relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act caution that "questions should not be designed to challenge the truth of anything said by the accused,"
that "there should be no reiteration of question which the accused has refused to answer," that "there should be no leading questions," and that it is the sheriff's responsibility to "ensure that all questions are fairly put to, and understood by, the accused."
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1980, ch. 62, sec. 6(2), § 20A(2)(a)-(c). Although the
accused may decline to answer - and some do, typically citing the advice of counsel
- the prosecutor and judge may comment at trial on the accused's failure to answer
whenever the accused or any defense witness has testified about a matter that the accused might have explained at the examination. See Alexander v. H.M. Advocate, 1988
Scottish Crim. Cas. Rep. 542, 1989 Scots L. Times 193.

a
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express the judgment that, following a showing of probable cause, suspects can reasonably be expected to respond to orderly inquiry. For the
same reason, a defendant should be expected to speak at trial - perhaps under oath but exempted from the penalties for perjury 176 - and if
she declined, the jury or judge should be permitted to draw appropriate
inferences. 177
176. Pennitting defendants to testify under oath but.exempting them from the penalties for perjury would resemble the practice of the High Commission in the early seventeenth century, but despite the infamy of the High Commission, the compromise
might be appropriate. Jeremy Bentham once observed that courts need not avoid sitting
in chambers decorated with stars merely because the court of Star Chamber met in such
a chamber. 5 BENTHAM. supra note 141, at 241.
The primary reason for retaining the oath despite the absence of a fonnal sanction
for violating it would be to avoid a sharp, unexplained contrast in fonn between the testimony of defendants and the testimony of other witnesses. Perhaps a defendant should
be allowed to present her testimony with the same solemn promise of truthfulness as
other witnesses even if she is not threatened with punishment fqr falsehood.
Justice Walter Schaefer once said of a regime in which defendants were questioned
at trial but not under oath, "These rules seem to me to follow natural assumptions. The
silence of the accused is noted and taken into account because of the strength of the inference of guilt that flows from his failure to respond; the refusal to administer an oath
to the accused, or to force him to answer, reflects spiritual and physical aspects of the
law of self-preservation invoked by John Lilburn before the Star Chamber." SCHAEFER, supra note 32, at 71.
177. Amidst the disturbing "get tough on crime" laws of the late twentieth century, Congress or a state legislature might actually enact a fair and useful "get tough"
measure:
Section 001. Testimony of the Defendant.
(A) A defendant may testify under oath in the same manner as any other witness
or may decline to testify. ·
(B) When a defendant testifies, his or her testimony shall not be the subject of a
prosecution for perjury and shall not be subject to impeachment by proof of prior
criminal convictions.
(C) When a defendant declines to testify, his or her failure to explain incriminating circumstances may be considered by the finder of fact for any rational inference that it yields, and trial participants may comment upon this failure at argument as they could upon other circumstances of the case.
No member of the Supreme Court at the time of Griffin v. California is still on the
Court, and today's Court might not be notably sympathetic to the Griffin ruling. By exempting a defendant's testimony from the threat of a perjury prosecution, however, the
suggested statute would provide a substantial basis for distinguishing Griffin. The
Supreme Court might therefore pennit comment on a defendant's silence without overruling Griffin. If the suggested statute were enacted, prosecutors would be wise to use
the power that it confers sparingly until its constitutionality had been tested.
The proposed exemption of the defendant's testimony from impeachment by proof
of prior convictions (afforded by subsection (B) of the statute) would remove a substantial impediment to many defendants' exercise of the right to present a defense - an impediment that in practice deprives fact finders of more infonnation than it gives them.
This exemption would not preclude the use of prior convictions as substantive evidence.
Cf. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
198 Stat 1796 § 40141, 108 Stat. 1796, 1918-19 (amending Rule 404(b) of the Federal
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The history of the privilege against self-incrimination may raise as
many questions for modern courts as it answers, but if a state legislature were to approve a procedure like this one, a court could take much
of its guidance from the past. Because this procedure would require a
showing of solidly grounded suspicion before interrogation could begin,
it would be consistent with the maxim Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum as
that maxim was understood in the ius commune and as it was enforced
by the common law courts against the High Commission. The procedure also would be consistent with the original understanding of the
Fifth Amendment privilege, for the Framers saw no tension between the
privilege and their own interrogation practices - practices that differed
from the proposal only in that they lacked some of its safeguards. Finally, the procedure would be consistent with the principles of ordinary
morality articulated by Kent Greenawalt. When neither text, history, nor
sensible policy condemns a practice, a court should find it constitutional; and if the practice seems inconsistent with the right to remain silent, courts should read the Constitution again. With· the help of history
and of ordinary morality, they should look at what the Fifth
Amendment really says.

Rules of Evidence to permit proof of prior offenses in sexual assault cases). The propriety of using prior convictions to impeach a defendant's testimony warrants greater consideration than an article on a different subject can provide. I raise the issue only because a legislature could not fairly encourage defendants to testify without reexamining
it.

